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Summary Findings
This paper reviews the experience with public works programs (PWPs) in several 
countries over the past 20 years to delineate use patterns and to determine the 
factors contributing to its use as a successful safety net program. The analysis 
shows that PWP have been used extensively in response to either a one-time large 
covariate shock, or repeated shocks. In low income countries, PWPs also have an 
antipoverty or poverty reduction objective. Our review shows that well designed and 
implemented PWPs can help mitigating income shocks; the program can also be 
used as an effective anti-poverty instrument. The paper examines the factors behind 
the observed wide variation in the effectiveness of the program in accomplishing its 
goals and identifies prerequisites for making PWPs successful safety net interventions 
capable of protecting the poor from income shocks, thus reducing both temporal and 
seasonal poverty, while creating useful public goods or services for the communities. 
For PW programs to be successful, it is important firstly to: a) have clear objectives; 
b) select projects that can create valuable public goods; and c) ensure predictable 
funding. Secondly, the success of the program depends critically on careful design 
and incorporation of all the key design features. Finally, a credible monitoring and 
evaluation system designed right upfront, prior to launching of the program can allow 
for mid course corrections and to respond to sudden changes which can inhibit 
effective implementation. The potential of the PWP program is enormous both in 
countries that have experiences with these programs and especially in countries that 
never used them. However, more research is needed investigation is needed to better 
understand the impact of PWPs, such as second round effects from the created assets, 
the impacts on the labor market, and their cost-effectiveness after factoring in both 
the immediate and second round benefits from its program.
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Abstract 
This paper reviews the experience with public works programs (PWPs) in several countries over 
the past 20 years to delineate use patterns and to determine the factors contributing to its use as a 
successful safety net program.  The analysis shows that PWP have been used extensively in 
response to either a one-time large covariate shock, or repeated shocks.   In low income countries, 
PWPs also have an antipoverty or poverty reduction objective.  Our review shows that well 
designed and implemented PWPs can help mitigating income shocks; the program can also be 
used as an effective anti-poverty instrument.  The paper examines the factors behind the observed 
wide variation in the effectiveness of the program in accomplishing its goals and identifies pre-
requisites for making PWPs successful safety net interventions capable of protecting the poor 
from income shocks, thus reducing both temporal and seasonal poverty, while creating useful 
public goods or services for the communities.  For PWPs to be successful, it is important firstly 
to: a) have clear objectives; b) select projects that can create valuable public goods; and c) ensure 
predictable funding. Secondly, the success of the program depends critically on careful design 
and incorporation of all the key design features.  Finally, a credible monitoring and evaluation 
system designed right up front, prior to launching of the program can allow for mid course 
corrections and to respond to sudden changes which can inhibit effective implementation.  The 
potential of the PWP program is enormous both in countries that have experiences with these 
programs and especially in countries that never used them.  However, more research is needed to 
better understand the impact of PWPs, such as second round effects from the created assets, the 
impacts on the labor market, and their cost-effectiveness after factoring in both the immediate and 
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I.  Introduction   
Public work programs have been an important counter-cyclical safety nets instrument 
used in diverse country circumstances at different points in time in both middle income and low 
income countries.  Typically, a public work program (or workfare)
1 is the one where a federal or 
a provincial government or a donor agency or an NGO finances and/or implements a program 
that creates temporary jobs for workers
2.  The output of such a program is twofold:  jobs of short 
duration for workers to increase their income, and creation of public goods in the form of new 
infrastructure or improvements of existing infrastructure, or delivery of services.  Inputs are wage 
cost (in cash or kind
3
 
), managerial costs and material costs.  The outputs in turn are expected to 
lead to three final outcomes (impacts): (a) increased income and consumption-smoothing, (b) a 
reduction in poverty and poverty gap ratio, and (c) infrastructure development.  Public works 
program can have all three outcomes as main objectives but any combination of outputs, inputs 
and outcomes is possible.  
Countries have introduced public works programs with diverse objectives such  as 
protection from large covariate shocks (such as natural disasters, macro crisis, or seasonal labor 
demand shortfalls), to protect households from temporary job losses, fight against poverty, or to 
help poor to gain more temporary employment.  Moreover, public works program could be 
regarded as one of the few safety net programs with a history dating back in recent times to the 
1930 in the United States, and mid-1940s in Germany when the program was launched in the 
wake of post-war reconstruction
4.  More recently, countries in almost all regions of the worlds 
and at different levels of development (middle income, low income) have launched the program, 
driven by one motivation or another.  Countries like India and Bangladesh have a long history 
and experience with public workfare programs to fight against chronic poverty
5
                                                 
1  Throughout this paper, “public works” and “workfare” are used interchangeably to represent the same type of 
intervention.  
 and address work 
2 The agency that finances the program does not necessarily need to be the agency that implements the program.  
Indeed, there are now currently a variety of public-private-donor partnerships in financing and implementing of public 
works programs in different countries (see section 3). 
3 Programs with remuneration in-kind are usually referred to as Food for Work (FFW) and those with remuneration in 
cash are referred to as Cash for Work (CFW).  Historically most programs have been in kind, the Civilian Conservation 
Corps in the United States, used to provide aid to less well-off citizens, can be considered as antecedents to cash for 
work (CFW) programmes. CFW are used more often as an alternative to FFW, in all settings included post-disaster and 
conflict environments 
4 As a matter of fact there have been other experiences with public works programs in the past.  See for example the 
experience of the Poor employment act of Victorian England in the eighteen century, used to hire surplus labor to build 
canals and roads and draining marshes and laid the foundations of the industrial revolution, or even the experience of 
fourth century BC in India, or the pharos in ancient Egypt. 
5 See Subbarao (2003).  
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shortages during the slack agricultural season.  Public works program has also become an 
important conduit to deliver humanitarian assistance in post-disaster or post-conflict situations.   
 
The long history, varying motivations, and the complexity of the program’s many design 
features render the program less amenable to an understanding of what makes the program a 
success, and under what country circumstances, and when is the program likely to serve as a good 
candidate to accomplish the outcomes expected of it.  While previous research (Subbarao, 2003) 
has explored the key design features accounting for program success, the effectiveness (or lack 
thereof) of the program under diverse country conditions, and the required program-specific 
systems of monitoring and evaluation to assess the effectiveness, is less well understood.  There 
has been no critical review of program experience in the recent past, despite the fact that a 
number of countries have relied on this program instrument for many years and are planning to 
expand their role in the future.  This is the case in Nepal, Bangladesh, Rwanda, and most notably 
of India, where the government has introduced a guaranteed employment for 100 days for the 
rural poor.  This paper fills this gap. 
 
Using the most recent program-specific secondary data on a range of countries which 
operated a public works programs over the past 20 years, this paper aims to delineate the factors 
accounting for the program’s effectiveness.  This is done by reviewing cross-country variations in 
the design, implementation procedures and delivery models.  It then discusses methods for 
monitoring and evaluation specific to public works, and reviews results of studies completed thus 
far.  This paper is essentially a survey of existing research rather than new research; yet it fills a 
gap inasmuch as no such comprehensive survey has yet been attempted.  It is hoped that this 
survey paper will be useful to countries and/or donors or NGOs, intending to launch this program 
in the future, or planning to modify current design features or introduce effective monitoring and 
evaluation systems. 
  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section (II) provides an 
overview of the prevalence of the program and the main motivation (objectives) underlying the 
program by alternative country typologies.  Section III reviews the available recent secondary 
data from the perspective of  design features (wage fixing, labor intensity, and  seasonality), 
implementation modalities and delivery models, and approaches to targeting.   Section  IV 
discusses the methods and data requirements for monitoring and evaluation of the program, and 
reviews the admittedly limited evidence on the outcomes and impacts of the program.    Based on  
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the relationship between the pattern and design across a range of countries, Section V draws some 
tentative conclusions on how to make the program effective, and offers some suggestions for 
further research.    
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II.   Objectives and rationale of PW programs 
Public works programs are launched with various objectives in mind.  Providing to poor 
households a source of income by creating  temporary jobs is of course the most  important 
motivation.  In practice the objective of raising the income of the poor can be achieved by a 
number of specific objectives of public workfare program. These include: mitigation for covariate 
shocks (both unexpected and seasonal), mitigation for idiosyncratic shocks; antipoverty, and 
workfare as a bridge to more permanent employment. Of course, many of the objectives listed 
above are not mutually exclusive and they all raise the income of the poor.  However, the 
proposed classification is helpful in pointing out possible trade-offs between alternative 
objectives and related design features such as the number of people to hire and the number of 
days of work offered, and so on.  In addition, PWP also need to achieve  complementary 
objectives of generating public goods for the community, which may in turn lead to secondary 
employment/income benefits. 
2.1.  Mitigation for Covariate shocks (one-time shock and seasonal) 
PWPs provide an income transfer via wages to smooth consumption of poor households 
in the wake of a major shock such as economic crisis (including stabilization programs or other 
reforms causing sharp rise in unemployment and poverty) or natural disaster (i.e. flood, drought, 
earthquake) or seasonal shortfalls in employment and income (i.e. drought season, or agricultural 
slack season in low income agrarian economies).  Most low income countries do not have formal 
unemployment insurance programs for a variety of reasons including feasibility (underdeveloped 
financial markets) and inability to finance the program.  Typically in these countries the program 
runs intensively right after the crisis occurred or a few months in a year and then scaled down in 
better times.  
 
The workfare programs launched soon after the macroeconomic crisis in East Asia in 
1997, Latin America in 2002 and after the tsunami recently hit many Asian countries in 2005, are 
all examples of programs set up to mitigate the negative effects of a shock among the most 
vulnerable population.  In Bangladesh, the Food for Work (FFW) has been operating since 1975 
as counter-cyclical workfare program providing the rural poor with employment opportunities 
during lean (dry) season, mostly in construction and maintenance of rural roads, river 
embankments, and irrigation channels. 
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India is one of the few countries in the developing world to have implemented public 
works as  early as 1950’s, shortly after independence, with the main objective of providing 
temporary employment during the agricultural slack season.  Unlike in some African countries, 
India over time developed in-house capacity to implement the program, so that when hit by a 
major drought, its program was ready to expand.  This program came in handy when its country 
was hit by a massive drought in 1987, often known as the drought of the century.  The program 
protected the poor from severe consumption shortfall (Rao, Ray, and Subbarao, 1988) . 
 
It is worth mentioning that the objectives of a public works program may well change 
over time. For instance, the Bolivia’s Plan Nacional de Empleo de Emergencia (PLANE) was 
launched as a temporary intervention with the objective to generate employment for poor families 
in urban and rural areas during the economic crisis. Afterward, PLANE was extended and 
incorporated as permanent anti-poverty instrument in the Red de Proteccion Social (RPS), created 
by the government in 2004 due to the prolonged difficult economic and social situation. 
Similarly, in response to the severe economic crisis that hit Mexico in 1995, the government 
launched the Programa de Empleo Temporal (PET) to support the income of the most vulnerable 
and it is currently addressing the structural problems which inhibit income and employment 
generation.  In Yemen, the Public Works Project was set up in 1996 with the overall development 
objective to mitigate the adverse effects of the economic adjustment
6
2.2.  Mitigation for Idiosyncratic shocks (Insurance / Guarantee) 
 through poverty alleviating 
measures targeted to the country’s poor communities and the third phase is currently operating to 
provide the needed infrastructure and short term employment in the poorest rural areas of Yemen.  
The motivation here is to guarantee employment at a low wage when demanded by 
workers.  In other words, workers here enjoy the freedom to move in (when market wage is low 
or work not available) and out (when the market wage is better than the public works wage).  So 
PWP here provides an “option price” to workers to be used when needed. In countries where 
there is no formal unemployment insurance, this program virtually performs an insurance 
function.  The Maharastra Employment Guarantee Scheme in India, which is currently being 
                                                 
6 ‘The Government of Yemen (GOY), since 1995, has been implementing an economy-wide reform program designed 
to stabilize the economy and stimulate sustainable growth. The stabilization program has been successful, with core 
inflation dropping from about 65 percent in 1994 to around 6 percent in 1997; this has lately gone up and expected to 
be around 10.5 percent for 2003. Reform measures included lowering of tariffs and other barriers to trade, moving from 
a multiple to a single market-determined exchange rate; moving to eliminate price controls; reducing regulations, 
licensing requirements, and other barriers to entry for new firms; and gradually cutting subsidies to public enterprises.’ 
(Project Appraisal Document for a Third Public Works Projects, World Bank Report No: 27266, 2004).  
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nationally expanded through the ‘National Rural Employment Guarantee Act’
7
 
, falls in this 
category. Specifically, the Act mandates all state governments to provide at least 100 days of 
guaranteed wage employment to household’s adult members who are willing to do casual manual 
labor at the statutory minimum wage (Government of India, 2008).  
2.3.  Anti-poverty 
PWPs designed as a major anti-poverty program provide substantive income support to 
poor families in countries with a large segment of poor unemployed or underemployed workers. 
In those cases, programs are launched and implemented pretty much throughout the year and are 
also likely to hire people for longer periods of time.  Moreover they may also use explicit 
targeting mechanisms in addition to or instead of self-targeting induced by setting the wage rate 
at an appropriate level.  
 
If the program disproportionately benefits the poor, and it is financed out of general tax 
revenue, and if the structure of the taxation in the country is strongly progressive, then public 
works programs can also perform a redistributive function.  Whether or not the twin function – 
insurance and redistribution – are actually performed by public works program is an empirical 
question.  This paper aims to assess the first function, but not the second.  In addition, if the 
program leads to the creation of public goods in region/areas where disproportionally the poor 
live, the redistribution effect is further strengthened.  
In Ethiopia, where food insecurity and poverty are widespread both in rural and urban 
areas, particularly in drought-prone districts, a potentially more effective way to reduce poverty 
has been recently used.  With donors’ financial support, the government recently launched the 
‘Productive Safety Net Programme’, a public works program
8
In Bangladesh, the Rural Maintenance Program (RMP) and the food for assets of WFP 
select the beneficiaries using poverty criteria and then try to retain them for longer period of time. 
 that contributes to improving the 
productivity and efficiency of transfers to food insecure households, reducing household 
vulnerability, improving resilience to shocks through multi-year predictable resources rather than 
through a system dominated by emergency humanitarian aid. 
                                                 
7 The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. The Gazette of India, No. 42 OF 2005, published on September 5, 
2005. Posted at: http://rural.nic.in/rajaswa.pdf 
8 The Productive Safety Net Programme consists of two components: (i) a labour-intensive Public Works component; 
and (ii) a Direct Support component to ensure support to those households who have no labour at all, no other means of 
support, and who are chronically food insecure. (Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 
December 2004, PSNP, Programme Implementation Manual).    
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The RMP
9
The anti-poverty objective does not motivate workfare programs only in low income 
countries, but also in higher income contexts facing structural unemployment problems, 
especially widespread among the poor.   Whereas in low income countries the antipoverty 
objective is intended to provide income assistance to the chronic poor (which represent a high 
proportion of the population), as the country’s level of income increases, a public work program 
is still intended to help the poor, but its focus is different, such as countering a situation of 
structural or rising unemployment, or to help specific fragments of the population.  
 provides year-round employment to approximately 42,000 destitute rural women for a 
period of up to 4 years.  Their task is to maintain 84,000 kilometers of earthen rural roads around 
their villages across the country.  The Food for Assets program provides a combination of food 
and cash wages and skill training for the ultra poor who participate in food for assets creation 
activities. Community infrastructure and physical asset building activities (e.g. fish ponds, tree 
plantation, raised homesteads, small drainage canals, irrigation systems, community shelters, 
raised central community areas, village connecting rural roads, river embankments, dykes etc) 
take place during the period of January to June.  Overall the program employed 245,000 
beneficiaries over a period of 2001-2005.  Each participant received 2 kg wheat and taka 20 per 
day during the working months and 20 kg of wheat and taka 100 per month to participate in the 
training activities (Roy, 2006). 
In South Africa, for example, the ‘Expanded Public Works Program’
10
                                                 
9 For more details on RMP, see the website of CARE Bangladesh: http://www.carebd.org/projects.html 
 (EPWP) is one of 
the government’s programs aimed at confronting the structural unemployment and for providing 
work opportunities for the unemployed.  They provide work and training opportunities to more 
than one million people a year in four  different sectors: a) infrastructure for labor-intensive 
construction and maintenance of low-volume roads, storm water drains, trenching for pipelines 
and sidewalks; b) environmental land rehabilitation, coastline cleanup and recycling program; c) 
Social care for aids patients and early childhood development; and d) economic participation in 
micro-enterprises learner ship program.  The average length of the participation goes from four 
months in the infrastructure sector to over one year, thus providing a steady income for those 
beneficiaries.   
10 For details on the program, see the Government’s website: http://www.epwp.gov.za/  
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2.4.  As a bridge to employment 
PWPs may include training as a core component in addition to the income transfer to 
encourage workers to acquire the needed skills to gain more permanent employment or become 
self-employed.  The additional requirements attached to workers may include saving some of 
their wage earnings, learn technical skills, and eventually obtain a credit (at the going rate of 
interest) and begin an activity.  However, cross-country experience is rather limited on this 
component.  
 
A few programs have training components to direct women towards self-employment.  In 
Bangladesh, the Rural Maintenance Program (RMP) requires the women participating into the 
program to attend income generating and skills training. In addition, they must save part of their 
wage on a regular basis (participants are paid a wage of 51 Taka per day with a forced savings of 
Tk10).  The strategy is to create new micro-entrepreneurs with adequate skills training and seed 
capital from the forced savings (CGAP, 2006).  A similar program was started in 1999 in two 
districts of the Central Region of Malawi, the Central Region Infrastructure Maintenance 
Program (CRIMP), a DFID–CARE program which employed 1600 poor women in rural roads 
maintenance. 
 
Other programs have explicit training component thereby enabling workers to acquire the 
needed skills to transition into a more regular employment. Jefes program in Argentina included 
an option for participants to work or participate in training or education activities for 4–6 hours a 
day (no less than 20 hours a week) in exchange for the payment.  The EPWP program in South 
Africa provide training opportunities beyond the skills acquired on the job to prepare participants 
for possible longer-term employment, self-employment, or further education or training.  For 
example, youth employed as manual laborers on a labor-intensive roads project, may be offered 
training in unrelated building skills such as bricklaying, if there is demand for such skills in the 
labor market.  The number of average training days varies from 10 days in the environmental 
sector to 30 days for those participating in social activities.  As far as possible, all training must 
result in some type of accredited certification.  
 
2.5.  Complementary objectives and types of public goods and services provided 
One important complementary objective of public works program is to generate public 
goods for the community.  The list of actual goods and services that has been provided by public  
  9 
works programs is very long and varies depending on the need of the countries and the level of 
income and availability of public infrastructure and services.  These may include: a) creation, 
maintenance, or reconstruction (i.e. after natural disasters) of existing infrastructures, like roads, 
small bridges, schools, health posts, sanitation improvements; b) environmental and agricultural 
projects  such as, irrigation, afforestation, soil conservations and watershed development; c) 
cleaning roads  and other public facilities; and d) social services including day care, food 
preparation and so on.  A detailed list of the types of activities undertaken by the public works 
programs is shown in Appendix 4.  Here we present some notable examples to give an idea of the 
range of activities in a few countries.   
 
In Yemen, public works projects respond to the immense need for access to infrastructure 
for basic social services such as schools, roads, health, and other sectors, intended to serve the 
poor and deprived communities especially in remote rural areas
11
http://pwpyemen.org
.  Thus, they provide the much 
needed support for achieving poverty reduction as it is shown in Figure 1 below 
( ). 
 
Figure 1:  Link between access to infrastructures provided by public works and poverty 
reduction in Yemen  
 
 
Source: Yemen Public Works project, 2008 
                                                 
11 Geographically, Yemen is distinguished by its dispersed communities that makes delivery of infrastructure services 
in terms of quality and cost a gigantic task, especially that PWP’s investments are mainly in small scale projects (sub-
project that cost less than US$ 60,000 represent 88% of total numbers).  Such a strategy is more effective when 
resources are limited, and ensuring maximum number of communities are reached (http://pwpyemen.org).  
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High labor intensive public works projects can be effectively used in the aftermath of 
natural disasters, for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged or destroyed 
infrastructures.  In Madagascar, the works performed mainly involve the reconstruction and/or 
repair of damaged basic infrastructure (roads, irrigation canals, small dams, bridges), and clean 
up of canals and routes  following natural disasters.  They are implemented by the FID 
(Development Intervention Fund) in the form of small-scale HLI projects in areas of the island 
mostly affected by cyclones and other disasters. 
 
In addition to the above mentioned relatively well-known areas of public works activity, 
there have been some recent attempts to use public works in the wake of newly emerging crises, 
e.g., in response to HIV-AIDS crisis, in urban settings, in fragile states, and in preventing 
climate-change associated risks.   
 
Public works response to HIV-AIDS related vulnerability.  Creative ways have been 
devised to make effective use of public works programs in response to the challenge of 
HIV/AIDS in Southern and Eastern Africa. In this case the types of work performed include the 
support for social infrastructures in areas affected by high prevalence of HIV/AIDS such as 
providing Home Based Care (HBC), or Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) are 
responses to such a situation, with examples being the Red Cross’s Home Based Care 
Programmes in Zimbabwe and Malawi, and the Working for Water ECD program in South Africa 
(McCord, 2005). 
 
Public works in urban areas.  Public works programs can also be rendered conducive to 
employing unemployed youth especially in urban areas.  Clearly the design elements of the 
program need to be adjusted so as to encourage the youth to participate.  For example, youth, 
while engaging in public works activities, may also like to be prepared to compete in formal labor 
markets.  To facilitate such preparation, youth may be encouraged to undergo training in 
vocational and/or professional skills for two or three hours a day in an institution or as an 
apprentice to a master technician.  A program of this nature is being developed in Kenya to 
engage the youth in urban slums in public works activity.  Potential for engaging the youth in 
carefully designed public works activities in urban areas exists in a number of countries with high 
urban unemployment especially in the wake of the recent food and macro crises not only in 
African countries but also in some low income East Asian countries like Indonesia which are 
experiencing serious urban youth unemployment problem.   
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Public works in fragile states.  Finally, public works program has proven to be a highly 
suitable intervention in fragile states coming out of years of conflict.  These countries face severe 
development challenges such as weak institutional capacity, poor governance, political instability, 
and frequent ongoing violence.  Notwithstanding these challenges, several fragile states have 
implemented public works program.  For example, in Sierra Leone, soon after the conflict ended, 
a public workfare program was launched that helped rebuild the infrastructure damaged during 
the conflict, and also provide immediate short term employment opportunities to poor households 
who suffered immensely during the conflict, and also to ex-combatants.  After the conflict ended, 
public works programs have been quickly launched and scaled up in Liberia, Yemen, Sierra 
Leone, Sudan, Guinea and Guinea Bissau.  In Nepal, which has just emerged out of a decade-long 
internal conflict, a national public workfare program is being designed.   
 
Climate change and risk prevention.  PW can have a very important role in reducing and 
mitigating the risk of climate change by generating environmentally sound public goods.  Some 
of the assets created can increase the resilience of the communities, such as water storage, 
embankments.  Others projects such as afforestation, soil conservation projects, can help 
protect the environment from the adverse impact of climate change.  Soil conservation 
projects carried out semiarid areas have been effective in slowing down the 
desertification, erosion and generating new forest areas.  This is the case of projects 
carries out several years ago in Tunisia, where their impact is still visible, and still being 
done in the Sahel and in the Ethiopia PSNP, and in the arid zone in the Maharashtra state 
of India (World Bank, forthcoming WDR on climate change). 
 
In Ethiopia, most of the activities under the PSNP  are focused on soil and water 
conservation activities (Table 1) reflecting the needs of the poor agricultural communities.  The 
works have already brought demonstrable  benefits to the communities in the form of 
environmental transformation.  For example, improved water conservation has led to increased 
agricultural productivity and an increase in groundwater recharge such that dry springs have 
started to flow again.  In addition, the communities have enhanced income generation from area 
closure, and improved access to markets, education and health facilities (Grosh et al, 2008). 
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Table 1:  Sample of Public Works Supported under the PSNP, Ethiopia 2007 
 
Source: Food Security Coordination Bureau, 2007. 
 
Under the famous Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme, roads and infrastructure 
were the main activities.  Maharashtra has a huge dry and arid zone.  Focusing on all types of 
irrigation structures substantially increased the areas under irrigation for a second crop, thus 
enhancing the scope for greater second round employment effect (Subbarao, 2003)
12
 
.   
In the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program of the  Indian Government, 
emphasis is laid on activities that enhance agricultural productivity and generate long term 
dynamic income/employment gains.  Available data reported in Figure 2 show that during the 
financial year 2007-08 more than 70 percent of planned works under the NREGA program are 








                                                 
12 Labour coefficients for irrigation are largest in India (Rao, Subbarao and Roy, 1988). 
Project Result
Soil embankment construction (kilometers) 482,542
Stone embankment construction (kilometers) 443,148
Pond construction and maintenance (number) 88,936
Spring development (number) 598
Hang-dug well contruction (number) 491
Land rehab. through area encosure (hectares) 530
Small-scale irrigation canals (kilometers) 2,679
Tree nursery site establishment (number) 285
Seedlings produced (number) 301,778,607
Seedling planted (number) 12,883,657
Rural road construction (kilometers) 8,323
Rural road maintenance (kilometers) 20,458
School classroom construction (number) 340
Animal health post contruction (number) 71
Farmer training center contruction (number) 119 
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Source: Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development. 2008.  
 
Role of PW with respect to other programs and role of social assets.  PW have a very 
important role in the overall poverty reduction strategy.  However, PW must be combined with 
other targeted safety nets to provide the necessary support to labor constrained households and 
those that are chronically poor who cannot participate in public works.  In fact in countries with 
widespread levels of unemployment and underemployment standard short term public works 
programs are unable to lift chronic poor out of poverty (Grosh et al. 2008; and McCord, 2007).  
However the social assets created with PWP might have an important role in alleviating 
constraints to higher returns for poor people, regardless of their participation into the program, as 
long as the public good produced are relevant, well executed and maintained.  Some examples of 
use of public works in generating social assets are given below.  
 
All Works  
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In middle income countries the type of activities included the provision of social services.  
In Argentina, the  menu  of projects eligible for financing by the Jefes  program include also 
community services besides minor construction, repair, expansion, maintenance or remodelling of 
schools, health facilities, basic sanitation facilities, small roads and bridges, and on a pilot basis, 
some productive activities (World Bank Jefes ICR, 2007).  
   
Table 2.  Subprojects with Project Co-Financing for Materials 
13
under Jefes in Argentina (over 2003-2006) 
  
 
Source: World Bank Jefes ICR, 2007 
 
In South Africa also the types of public works projects under the EPWP include social 
and economic activities besides the more traditional infrastructure activities.  This is reflected by 
two of the four sectors, which have been identified as having the greatest impact on employment 
creation,  namely:  (i) infrastructures, including large-scale initiative to use labor-intensive 
methods to upgrade rural and municipal roads, municipal pipelines, and storm-water drains; (ii) 
environment, creating work opportunities in public environmental improvement projects; (iii) 
social, creating work opportunities in public social projects (i.e. home-based care workers and 
early childhood development workers); (iv) economic, such as developing small businesses and 
cooperatives, including utilising general government expenditure on goods and services to 
provide the work experience component of small enterprise learnership / incubation programmes 
(http://www.epwp.gov.za/). 
  
It is important to stress that although the provision of public goods is not the primary 
objective of the public works program, it is indeed crucial.  There is no reason to do PW if the 
public goods generated do not have a positive impact on the community and are not built at a cost 
                                                 
13 Originally, two types of subprojects were envisaged. For the first (a) the project was to finance a share of the cost of 
materials as well as beneficiary payments; for the second (b) it was to finance only the payments to beneficiaries. Table 
2 only provides a list of subprojects of the first type. 





Productive and Development Infrastructure 251
Improvement of Neighborhood Conditions 169
Community Vegetables Gardens 65 
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similar to that charged using hired contracting procedures.  Therefore the success of a project 
depends on the quality of the public goods produced.  Murgai and Ravallion (2005) confirm that 
if India’s new National Employment Guarantee Scheme operates only for 100 days in the lean 
season, the scheme’s real gains can be limited to the social value of the assets created, as poverty 
rates would fall only slightly from 34 to 31 percent at a fiscal cost equivalent to 1.5 percent of 
GDP.  
2.6.  Cross country patterns 
Do countries show any pattern with respect to the implementation of public works 
programs in general and according to the objectives of programs and other key design features?  
For this analysis we have put together a database that includes all the available information from 
a total of 43 countries covering 49 public works programs, which have been implemented in the 
course of the past 20 years.  The information, partly summarized in the Appendix 2 and 3, was 
collected using a variety of sources ranging from project documents, project websites, published 
and unpublished studies and papers covering programs and so on. 
 
The information collected does not include the same information across countries and 
program and it is not representative, however it provides a remarkably interesting insight on the 
different objectives and features of many programs around the world.  For example, we have 
information on objectives of the programs only in a smaller sample of 30 countries implementing 
a total of 37 PWPs
14
 
.  The small sample of countries for which we have detailed information on 
objectives of the program renders delineation of patterns somewhat difficult and represents one of 
the limitations of the analysis in this section.  
  We start by looking at the distribution of programs by countries.  Public works programs 
exist in many countries across all Regions, with South Asia and sub Saharan Africa being the 
dominant Regions implementing this program.  As a corollary, a higher proportion of low income 
countries implement the programs, rather than higher income countries
15
 
.   
                                                 
14 We do not have complete information on the prevalence of PWPs in the past 20 years. Not all the countries had 
projects continuously operating for all 20 years. Most of the countries experienced projects that did not last very long, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, and some other countries had very old projects that lasted longer time, like in South 
Asia (Bangladesh, India). 
15 We used the World Bank classification of countries by income group, for 153 countries (high income countries 
excluded).  
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  Then we looked at the distribution of PWPs by number of participants.  We consider two 
classifications:  absolute number of participants by Region, and number of participants as 
percentage of active  labor force by Regions  (Figure  3).  It is not surprising that the largest 
absolute number of participants happen to be in the South Asia Region, a Region that pioneered 
the program several decades ago and a region housing the largest number of poor persons, 
followed by Sub Saharan Africa Region (where the Ethiopia’s PSNP provided work to over 7 
million beneficiaries in 2006 and Latin America. In terms of absolute numbers, the program is 
negligible in other Regions.   
 
Figure 3:  Participation (as absolute number of yearly participants, and as share of the 
Economic Active Population (EAP) 
16
 
 in those countries), by Region. 
  Source: Author’s calculation based on various sources of information.  
  Note: Data on participation are available for 43 countries and 49 PWPs. 
 
 
  However, participants as per cent of economically active population show an interesting 
regional pattern.  While the absolute number of participants in public works in Sub Saharan 
Africa is much lower than in South Asia, the percent of economically active population engaged 
in public works activity is about the same in both regions.  By contrast, the absolute number of 
participants in all other Regions is much lower, but the public works activity is clearly not that 
insignificant when considered as per cent of economically active population.  For example, as per 
cent of economically active population, the LAC region is about one third of South Asia and 
Africa Regions.   
 
                                                 
16 As a base to calculate the share, we refer to the sum of the economic active population in each country for which we 
have information on workfare programs, grouped by region (and not to the total economic active population within the 
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The pattern of distribution of programs by objectives is also quite interesting.  Out of 37 
public works programs, about 40% of projects were initiated to counteract the negative effects of 
covariate shocks, and about one fourth as an anti-poverty instrument. All other motives appear to 
be minimal.  A more detailed analysis of a regional pattern in the objectives of PWPs is reported 
in Figure 4.  In Latin America, one-time large shock (such as a macro economic crisis) is the sole 
motivation for launching a workfare program.  In sub Saharan Africa, the main motivation is to 
counter seasonal unemployment and as a poverty relief; in South Asia the motivation is largely as 
a poverty relief and counter-cyclical.  In the Middle East and East Asia the motivations are to 
counter the hardship of a large one-time  shock and as income transfer for the unemployed, 
whereas in Eastern Europe and Central the exclusive motivation of the program is to serve as an 
active labor market intervention.  Thus the motivations seem to exhibit a pattern by regions rather 
than by other country-specific characteristics.  This is understandable, given that countries in a 
given region have somewhat similar history and circumstances.  
    
Figure 4:  Distribution of workfare program objectives by Region 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on various sources of information.   
Note: This analysis is based on 30 countries implementing a total of 37 PWPs. 
 
 
Do objectives of the program vary by income-group?  This is shown in Figure 5. Not 
surprisingly, the antipoverty objective seems to motivate the launch of a workfare program 
mainly in low income countries.  A one-time large covariate shock largely motivated middle 
income countries.  The objective to serve as a bridge to more regular employment and as an 
insurance, are the motivations for a small number of countries in the low income group; and are 
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not the objectives in all other Regions.  Likewise, PWPs operate as ALMP only in middle-high-
income countries. 
 
A one-time large covariate shock motivated countries both in low income and upper 
middle income categories.  The program to serve as a bridge to more regular employment and as 
an insurance, are the motivations for a small number of countries in the low income group; and 
are not the objectives in all other Regions.  Finally, PWPs operate as ALMP only in middle-
income countries. 
 
Figure 5:  Distribution of workfare programs’ objectives by level of income 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on various sources of information.   
Note: This analysis is based on 30 countries implementing a total of 37 PWPs.  
Note: The y-axis represents the No. of programs in the sample with the same objective. 
 
 
What do we learn from this cross-country picture?  The dominant motivations for public 
workfare program for low income countries appear to be anti-poverty and as a program to cope 
with largely weather-induced shocks.  The two motivations are really not mutually exclusive, 
since addressing a shock actually prevents the emergency of poverty traps.  As for middle income 
countries, a large covariate shock – mostly induced by macro-economic or financial crises leading 
to a sharp rise in unemployment rates -- seems to drive them to introduce a public workfare 
program; all other objectives are less important.   
 
It is worth stressing that at every stage be it design stage or implementation stage, 
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given budget envelopment, a small number of individuals could be provided employment for 
longer periods albeit at a lower wage, or a larger number of individuals at a higher wage but for 
fewer days.  Likewise, in the implementation stage, works can be completed rapidly but with 
higher capital intensity albeit employing fewer workers, or somewhat less rapidly using a higher 
proportion of labor.  These tradeoffs and choices are discussed below at relevant sections.  
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III.   Design features and implementation  
  The design features of a workfare program fall into four  broad groups: (a) key 
implementation features that reflect the core characteristics and logic of the program and which 
significantly influence the overall cost and labor absorption potential of the program, such as the 
level of the wage rate, the numbers of hours worked, and the degree of labor intensity of works 
undertaken, (b) features that strongly influence the effectiveness of the program as a safety net, 
such as targeting method, seasonality of operations, and gender sensitivity of the program; c) 
financing methods and implication for local government and community involvement, and (d) 
features that impinge on the quality of the assets created and maintenance.  These design features 
are discussed below and are followed by an analysis of their patterns across countries. 
3.1.  Key implementation features 
  The key implementation features include setting the wage rate and the labor intensity of 
activities. 
The wage rate   
Three wage rates have to be distinguished: (a) program wage which a workfare program 
pays to hired laborers, (b) minimum wage which is the statutorily fixed wage rate, and (c) the 
market wage, which is typically the unskilled market wage for laborers which may be either 
below or above the statutory minimum wage.   In countries where the market wage is below the 
minimum wage (for whatever reasons including weak enforcement of the minimum wage), 
publicly funded program wage cannot be lower than the minimum wage, and hence it has to be 
higher than the local market wage for unskilled labor.  If this happens, the scope for self-selection 
is ruled out because the program wage, now higher than the ruling market wage, is most likely to 
attract the non-poor to the workfare program.   
 
  There is much variation across countries in the relationship between the program wage, 
market wage and the minimum wage (see Table 3). The limited information available renders the 
delineation of any pattern quite difficult. In general, we can say that most of the countries in our 
sample did succeed in maintaining the program wage relatively low, among which some countries 
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Table 3.  The relationship between Program Wage, Minimum Wage, and Market Wage 
 
Wpr in relation to Wmin and/or Wmkt              Country / Program and starting date 
 
Wpr=Wmin>Wmkt  Botswana LIPWP (1992), Wpr after 1998 
India MEGS (1975), Wpr after 1988 
India JRY (1989) 
 
Wpr=Wmin<Wmkt  Argentina Trabajar (1996), Wpr before 2000 
India MEGS (1975), Wpr before 1988 
Colombia Empleo en Accion (2001) 
Uruguay PAC (2003) 
 
            Wmin<Wpr<Wmkt                                                  Korea (1998) 
                                              
Wpr=Wmin  South Africa EPWP (2004)  
Indonesia PK (1998)  
Thailand SIP (1998) 
Morocco PN (1960s) 
Zambia PW (2002) 
 
            Wpr=Wmkt                                                   Egypt PWP (1993) 
                                                                             Indonesia Merci Corps’ CFW (2005) 
Somalia ACF’s CFW (2004) 
 
Wpr<Wmin<Wmkt  Argentina Trabajar (1996), Wpr after 2000 
Argentina Jefes (2002)   
     
Wpr<Wmkt  Bolivia PLANE (2001)  
Cape Verde FAIMO (1980s)  
Ethiopia FFW (1980), and PSNP (2005)  
Tanzania TASAF (2000)  
Afghanistan LIPW (2002)  
Bangladesh FFW (1974) 
Pakistan IGPRA (1984) 
 
Wpr<Wmin  Mexico PET (1995)  
Peru’ ‘A Trabajar Urbano and Rural’ (2002) 
Malawi MASAF (1995)  
Algeria IAIG (1994) 
Yemen (1996) 
 
Wmkt<Wpr<Wmin                  Botswana LIPWP (1992), Wpr before 1998 
                                                           Madagascar HIMO (FID) (2000)  
 
Wpr=Wmin + social contributions              Bulgaria (2002), Chile (1993) 
Legend: Program wage (Wpr), Minimum Wage (Wmin), and Market Wage (Wmkt) 
 
In countries where the program was kept lower than the market wage, a certain degree of 
self-selection of the poor into the program may have occurred, as it did in India’s Maharashtra 
Employment Guarantee Scheme prior to 1988 (when the minimum and program wage doubled) 
(Subbarao 1997).  Following the wage hike in 1988, the average monthly expenditures on EGS  
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fell as well as the number of person days of employment, leading to rationing of the program and 
consequently the erosion of employment guarantee (Subbarao, 1993; Ravallion  et al. (1993); 
Dev, 1995;  Subbarao et al. 1997; Subbarao, 1997;).  Table 4 shows that there is high variation in 
the level of the minimum and casual wage across States in India in 1999/2000, and that on 
average, 75% of casual laborers worked for less than the minimum wage.  This evidence suggests 
that an employment guarantee scheme in which the wage is set at the level of the minimum wage 
(which in many countries is higher than the market wage), would be extremely expensive for the 
Government and likely to result in poor targeting (by attracting the non-poor to the program – see 
O’Keefe, 2005). 
  
Table 4.  State agricultural minimum wage, average casual wage, and share of casual labor 
days 
 
Source: O’keefe (2005). 
 
In a situation where the market wage is higher than the minimum wage, publicly funded 
program wage can still be set either at the level of the minimum wage, or even slightly higher 
than the minimum wage, but lower than the prevailing market wage.  This type of wage setting is 
most likely to lead to self-selection of the poor in the program.  In the PWP introduced by Korea 
following the financial crisis in 1998, the program wage was set at a level slightly lower than the 
prevailing market wage  for unskilled labor to ensure that only those most in need would 
participate in the program.  During the crisis, the market wage rate fell, and the public works 
State
State minimum wage for 
agric. labor (Rs/day)
Avg casual wage (Rs/day) 
in 1999-00
% of casual labor days 
worked at less than state 
min. wage
AP 80 35 96.5
Assam 46 47 31.9
Bihar 59 36 93
Gujarat 60 40 73.4
Haryana 80 63 60.7
Karnataka 46 37 59.2
Kerala 91 91 40.1
MP 53 29 91.5
Mahrashtra 45 34 63.9
Orissa 50 29 93.3
Punjab 82 68 58.5
Rajasthan 60 53 60.8
TN 54 45 51.5
UP 58 41 66.4
W.Bengal 62 44 83.9
All-India --- 40 75.2 
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wage was adjusted downward several times to maintain self-targeting to the poorest (Subbarao, 
1999 and Hur Jai-Joon. 2001). 
 
However, in those countries where minimum wage is equal or above the market wage 
and restrictive employment laws prevent setting the wage below the minimum level, the 
possibility of using self-targeting mechanism is hindered. This is the case of Colombia’s Empleo 
en Acción
17 which is unable to self-select its beneficiaries due to the legal obligation to pay the 
minimum wage (and possibly benefits). Instead, Empleo  en Acción uses other targeting 
mechanisms by limiting the eligibility to workers classified as categories 1 and 2 (lowest income 
quintiles) in the SISBEN
18
 
 (System for Selecting Beneficiaries of Social Programs), which is a 
proxy-means testing system that classifies people based on assessment of living conditions of 
individual families. 
The choice of the remuneration method, daily rate/piece rate can also affect the targeting 
and outcomes of PWPs.  Task based payment provides flexibility and may attract more women to 
worksites (Dev 1995, Subbarao et al. 1997) or allow several member of a family to share the 
work. However, task-based payments can be confusing and difficult to administer and might be 
exploited by the gang leader and cause delay, like EGS program (Pellissery, 2006). 
 
In spite of the intent for self targeting, the program wage should be set in relation to the 
project goals. In the context of Somalia, a country afflicted by seasonal droughts and 
displacement of its population, migration and destocking are the most reliable and common 
coping mechanism in the area, traditionally served as a buffer against crop failure (Mattinen and 
Ogden, 2006).  The salary offered by Action Contre la Faim in southern Somalia was set for the 
most part taking into account the restocking objective among the poorest households, at a level 
slightly above the daily going rate for casual labor
19
                                                 
17 For more information on Colombia’s Social Safety Net system, see: World Bank. 2002. Colombia Social Safety Net 
Assessment. Report No. 22255-CO, August 30, 2002. 
.   
18 For details on the Colombia’s SISBEN, see: Tarsicio Castañeda. 2005. Targeting Social Spending To The Poor With 
Proxy–Means Testing: Colombia’s SISBEN System. June 2005. Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 0529. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/0529.pdf 
19 During the first phase, each household received 330,000 Somali shillings for 10 days of work. The amount was 
increased to 400,000 Somali shillings for 12 days of work in the second phase, to take into account the depreciation of 
the shilling against the US dollar—the amount remained the same in US dollars (USD 29.9). The Somali shilling 
payment was augmented so as not to decrease purchasing power due to devaluation. During the third phase, the overall 
amount was increased to 700,000 Somali shillings or USD 47.6 for the completion of 20 days of work, enough to cover 
the purchase of three goats and basic items (Mattinen and Ogden, 2006). 
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On the other hand, the wage rate offered by public works programs should not be set at 
such a low level below the reservation wage (opportunity cost of labor) because, apart from not 
making a dent on seasonal malnutrition, it would exclude poor households that have higher 
reservation wage because of existing constraints and stigma.  Barrett and Clay (2003) show that 
in Ethiopia FFW, imperfect factor markets caused poorer household to have a higher opportunity 
cost of labor, leading to inaccurate targeting outcomes.  As a solution, they propose to add simple 
categorical variables to be used in combination with a variety of wage rates to exclude better off 
people with high reservation wage:  such as too much land, some forms of capital, too many 
people in the households and so on. 
Effective wage rate and numbers of hours worked 
The numbers of hours worked has an impact on the actual wager rate and the 
participation in the program.  It is not unusual in African setting to allow people to work 4 or 5 
hours and get paid a full day wage.  The rationale is to allow people to attend their fields.  
Unfortunately this policy increases dramatically the actual wage rate, thus attracting a large 
number of people to participate in the program.  The common solution is to let all those willing to 
work participate into the program and ration the number of days worked.  This has happened in 
Madagascar for example workers are required to work 5 hours daily in HIMO
20
Labor intensity 
  projects 
(implemented by FID) for an average duration of 20 days, gaining a wage higher that the market 
wage for unskilled labor. Because of the high wages and the greater demand for employment than 
the employment opportunities created, almost everywhere a rotation system was applied to give a 
chance to work the largest number of poor people. 
  Labor intensity of a public works operation reflects the percentage of the labor cost on 
the overall cost of project.  It depends on a number of factors including the choice of the asset to 
be created, the wage rate and the ability of the agency implementing the program to budget 
adequately for non-wage costs.    Information on labor intensity is hard to obtain.  We have some 
indication of labor intensity only for about 19 countries (implementing 24 PWPs).  The data are 
shown in Figure 6.  Clearly in almost two-thirds of the projects the labor intensity is higher than 
60% clearly reflecting the fact that public works activity does provide significant benefits by way 
of short term employment to workers.  Labor intensity is low (below 40 percent of total cost) only 
in about 21 percent of the projects.  
                                                 
20 Note that HIMO is the French abbreviation for High Labor Intensive.   
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Figure 6: Labor intensity of PWPs (labor cost as % of total cost) 
 
  Source: Author’s calculation based on various sources of information.     
  Note: this analysis is based on 19 countries implementing a total of 24 PWPs.  
  Legend: Low: less than 40%; Medium: between 41% and 59%; High: higher than 60%. 
 
These averages however can conceal important inter-country differences.  For example, 
in the wake of the financial crisis, both Thailand and Korea implemented a workfare program.  
Whereas in Thailand the labor intensity was less than 20%, it was over 70% in Korea (See Figure 
7). The main reason for such a large difference in two similarly placed east Asian economies is 
because in Thailand the minimum wage was hiked periodically over the 20-year period that 
witnessed dramatic expansion of Bangkok city (which attracted laborers from the less developed 
eastern Thailand), so that when the crisis hit, the statutory minimum wage was high and the 
country was unable to adjust the program wage downwards.  With a high wage, it could not 
implement a higher level of labor intensity.  By contrast in Korea, the minimum wage was never 
raised; in fact during the boom period market wages in Korea rose sharply so that minimum wage 
almost became irrelevant.  But when the crisis hit, Korea was able to quickly adjust the market 
wage downwards (and yet keep it above the very low minimum wage), thus enabling the country 
to run a public works program of high labor intensity (Subbarao, 1999)  Thus, the degree of labor 
intensity depends a great deal on the wage rate and its historical evolution. 
 
Figure 7:  Labor intensity in activities selected for workfare, selected PWPs 
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3.2.  The design of safety nets features 
The effectiveness of PW as safety nets instrument depends on the ability of the program 
to provide additional source of income to the most vulnerable population when it is most needed.  
This means that the design of public works programs should pay close attention to the need for 
additional or complementary targeting method in addition using the wage rate as the key self-
targeting instrument as well as the length and timing of work.  Specific design features also have 
an impact on the objectives of increasing female participation into the programs.  Lastly, 
community participation and involvement are crucial for determining the usefulness and impact 
of projects locally. 
Targeting Method 
There is evidence showing that the use of multiple targeting methods makes the 
identification of the neediest more accurate and comprehensive, improving the targeting 
performance (Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott, 2004)
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Figure 8:  Distribution of countries by targeting method 
. The use of pure self selection, for example, 
might be insufficient  in reaching vulnerable groups in poor areas or when the demand for 
participation is very large and some form of employment rationing is needed.  We distinguish 
broadly three approaches to targeting: (a) self-selection, (b) self-selection in combination with 
other methods, and (c) other methods including geographic targeting.    Figure  8  shows the 
summary picture for all countries.  It shows that the least popular method is self-selection alone, 
whereas the most popular method is a combination of self-selection and other (such as geographic 
or community targeting). More than one-third of sample countries opted for a method other than 
methods (a) and (b). 
 
  Source: Author’s calculation based on various sources of information.  
  Note: this analysis is based on 30 countries implementing a total of 37 PWPs.  
                                                 
21 Moreover, in their review of 128 social assistance programs implemented in 48 countries, CGH found that there is 
not a clearly preferred targeting method. In fact, 80% of the variability in targeting performance was due to differences 
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The use of poverty mapping for geographical targeting may help focus the areas with 
higher poverty concentration within the country.  This has been done in Malawi, where targeting 
for participation in the MASAF public works occurs at two levels. The process starts with the 
identification of geographic areas based on the Vulnerability Assessment Mapping System 
(VAM) data, which takes into account factors such as food availability at the household level, the 
availability of coping mechanisms, and land.   Then, the management unit of MASAF in 
conjunction with the Poverty Monitoring Unit (PMU) is responsible to develop a suitable index 
and cut-off point of eligible areas.  Within the targeted areas, at the community level, wages are 
set below the minimum wage rate achieving self selection (MASAF, 2000).  Similar to MASAF 
PWP, Argentina’s Trabajar adopted a combination of geographical targeting and self selection 
through work requirement offering a wage rate which was initially set at the minimum wage 
(lower than the market wage) and subsequently lowered to a level below the minimum wage in 
2000. 
 
Seasonality of workfare operations 
 
  Ideally, the best time to run a public works program is when the opportunity cost of labor 
is low and more people are in need of a temporary source of income.  Typically in most agrarian 
economies the opportunity cost of labor is low during agricultural slack seasons.  However, even 
during the peak season, some workers may not be able to find work in normal economic 
activities.   So if the program is to serve an “insurance” function, the program has to operate 
throughout the year, the intensity varying between the seasons.  Country experiences differ a 
great deal with respect to the seasonality  of works activity.  Some countries have opted to run the 
program only during the agricultural slack seasons (for 4-5 months in a year) in which the 
program would serve “consumption-smoothing” function, but not an “insurance” function.  Some 
countries have opted to run the program throughout the year with varying degrees of intensity 
providing both insurance and consumption-smoothing for poor households.   
 
  Figure 9 to 13 provide some examples of seasonality of operation for some countries for 
which we have detailed information.  Both in the middle income countries of Brazil and 
Argentina, and the low income countries of India and Bangladesh, the program operated 
throughout the year, but clearly with greater intensity during the agricultural slack season.  These 
four countries probably represent some “good practice” example of countries where the program 
served the functions of insurance, consumption-smoothing and poverty reduction.  Bangladesh 
experience is particularly interesting.   
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Figure 9:  Peru, Trabajar Urbano employment generated, 2004-2006 
 
Source. Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción de Empleo, various years. 
Posted at: http://www.atrabajarurbano.gob.pe/empleos.htm 
Figure 10:  Brazil, Number of workers enlisted in the Northeast work front, 1998/2000 
 
Source. Rocha (2001). 
Figure 11:  Argentina, Jefes de Hogar (beneficiaries enrolled in the program and 
beneficiaries who left the program to be registered in the formal labor market 
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Figure 12:  India, MEGS employment 
 
Source: Subbarao (2003). 
Figure 13 : Bangladesh, Crop-sector labor demand and employment under the food-for-
work program (monthly averages) 
 
Source: Ahmed, Zohir et al (1995).Note: labor demand in the crop sector is for 1990. Estimates for FFW are 
based on averages for 1989/90-1991/92, and the FFW wage is assumed to be 4.6 kilograms) 
 
 
In Bangladesh Food for Works (FFW) program has been operating since 1975.  It aims to 
create food-wage employment during the slack season, mostly in construction and maintenance of 
rural roads, river embankments, and irrigation channels.  A major objective of the program is to 
provide income to the rural poor during the slack period when the unemployment rate in rural 
areas increases.  Wage payments are made in kind (that is, in wheat or rice) rather than in cash. 
Such a practice is thought to stabilize food grain  prices in the market and to improve food 
consumption and nutrition of the participating households before the following spring harvest.  
Over 85 percent of the FFW resources are used during January-May, which was the traditional 
slack season for agricultural activities during the early planning stages of the boro planting 
season.  Moreover, labor intensive earth moving projects cannot be conducted during the rainy 
season, when part of the country is under water or the ground is too wet to allow any work.  
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However, with the rapid expansion of cultivation of irrigated boro rice and wheat crops, 
employment opportunities in the agriculture sector in many areas have increased to substantial 
levels during this season in recent years, thus creating the need for alternative type of activities 
and times of implementation for public works programs. 
 
When  countries  implement public works to respond to regional crisis, seasonal 
consideration might be not be taken into account.  For example, in Morocco, the country quickly 
launched a workfare program to address a regional crisis that arose in one region of the country.  
Other times, financial constraints or implementation delays may prevent the preferred seasonal 
allocation of projects.  In Tanzania, for example, PWP subprojects were programmed to be 
carried out in the dry seasons so as to minimize disruptions of agricultural activities and enlist 
beneficiaries for the workfare program thus helping participants smooth consumption.  However, 
delays caused by subproject preparation disrupted this arrangement. 
 
There are also cases when year-round operation created problems inasmuch as it clashed 
with normal economic activities.  For example, in Zambia, tension was created between the 
employment offered under a public works program and the need for labor for regular farming 
activities.  Farmers chose to work for public works and as such may have spent less time on their 
own farms.  Scheme operators tried to solve the problem by imposing a regulation that public 
works activity be confined to 4-5 hours a day, but found it difficult to implement the regulation, 
and raised the implicit daily wage rate.  While there is no concrete evidence on the extent to 
which public works activity may have impacted adversely on farm output, the potential conflict 
between workfare activity and normal economic activity needs to be addressed preferably by 
adjusting the wage rate according to seasons.  For example, a slight lowering of the wage rate 
during the peak season might have avoided the flight of labor away from normal economic 
activities.  On the other hand, Afghanistan too ran the program during peak agricultural season 
and found it difficult to recruit persons for public works, probably because the wage rate wage 
was correctly set below the current agricultural wage rate. 
 
Gender Sensitivity 
The gender dimension of public works participation covers several concerns.  First, the 
need to provide access to women to direct wage employment, to protect them from loss of 
earnings; second a woman’s participation in the labor force and her control over resources is 
associated with substantially larger improvements in child welfare, and, women’s health and  
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status; lastly women’s benefits from assets created by PWPs (Dejardin ,1996; and Swamy, 2003).  
Swamy (2003) points to large variations in women’s participation in such programs, depending 
on the general characteristics of the labor markets and the specific characteristics of the programs 
considered. 
 
Design features of a PWP can be adapted in a number of ways to encourage female 
participation (Subbarao, 2003).  Women may be given priority at the design or recruitment stage. 
In a number of projects analyzed, a minimum percentage of women participation is set in the 
project guidelines. For example, in Malawi (MASAF) and India (SGRY) the target was set at 
30%, while in South Africa (EPWP) and Tanzania (TASAF) it was 40%.  These targets may not 
be reached in the actual program implementation, as it happened in Zambia where women 
participation was set at 60% while only 46% participated.  The type of payment may also have an 
impact on women participation.  Subbarao (2003), for example, notes that wages in-kind or piece-
wage payments may attract more women than men to work sites.  
 
In Yemen, in selecting any sub-project, highest priority was accorded to schemes that 
benefited children and women most, such as schools for girls, all water projects (which benefited 
women and children disproportionately), women’s training centers for income generating 
activities.    The Ethiopia’s Implementation Manual states that  ‘Public works are designed to 
enable women to participate, and priority is given to works which reduce women’s regular work 
burden’.  
 
The evidence on program’s  outcome  to encourage women’s participation in the 
production phase notwithstanding, there are still social barriers preventing women from actively 
participating in the planning process.  For instance, in MASAF, while the target in terms of 
women’s participation was more than achieved (MASAF, 2000), the percentage of women in 
PWP Project Management Committees (PMCs) was only 25% against the target of 50%.  The 
reasons advanced are that women in very poor and vulnerable households are so involved in 
survival activities that the opportunity cost of sitting in meetings is too high to be afforded (World 
Bank, 2004). 
Community involvement in project selection 
  Community involvement in the selection of sub projects has many advantages.  First it 
will result in the creation of infrastructure/assets that are most needed by the community.  Public 
works would then become a genuinely demand-driven activity. Second, it creates ownership of  
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the asset created and may lead to better maintenance of the asset (such as community water 
outlets).  Third, it may help on the site supervision of the project by the community (and thus 
contribute to better quality of the asset created.  Community involvement can be built into the 
design of the project.  For example, sub project selection could be done at open village meetings, 
or by the elected representatives of the village.   
 
  Experience with respect to community involvement, like all other design features, varies 
a great deal across countries.  In our sample of 37 PWPs, communities were involved in the 
identification of sub-projects to be undertaken in about 11 PWPs. The experience with respect to 
community involvement is particularly interesting in Yemen (see Box 1), which represents a 
success story of how to involve communities. 
Box  1.  Community ownership and sustainability of assets created: Public Works in Yemen 
The PWP in Yemen was established in 1996 to help mitigate the adverse effects of the economic 
adjustment on the poor population, especially in rural areas, through the creation of jobs and the provision 
of needed infrastructure. The third phase (2005-2008) is currently under implementation. 
 
Since its inception, it benefited poor communities mainly through its (indirect) benefits derived from the 
creation of quality assets. The level of direct benefits was somewhat reduced because contractors may hire 
own laborers from other areas. Active participation of poor communities is the corner stone in the success 
of delivered services. Their involvement encompasses:  
 
- Identification, prioritizing and selecting sub-projects according to their needs; 
- Contribution (in cash or in-kind) as prerequisite to implementation;  
- Implementation and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) of projects. 
 
This process increased community awareness of the program’s development aspects and their 
understanding of implementation issues. Moreover, it promoted a strong commitment of ownership (also 
proven by their willingness to contributions, which reached 11% of total project cost during the second 
phase, 1999-2003), and improved their abilities to assume responsibilities of completed projects, thus 
guaranteeing sustainability. 
 
During the second phase, PW generated about 95,000 person months of direct labor, and implemented 827 
projects (out of 8,000 project proposed by communities) for a total cost of about US$50.30million, mainly 
in the field of education facilities (57.3%), water (14.3%), roads (8%), and health (4.9%) (WB, 2003).  
These assets satisfied the needs of the most deprived communities: in fact, 80.5% of the subprojects were in 
the rural areas, where poverty in terms of lack of services, unemployment and weak economic conditions 
prevailed  
 
Sustainability is also reinforced by other factors such as: 
-- The presence of a modern MIS, being continuously developed and updated;  
-- Professional training activities for contractors, PW staff, consultancy services; 
-- Retention of part of the total subproject cost for future O&M needs. 
 
Thus, PW in Yemen represents a successful example of how community ownership strongly influences 
sustainability of assets created.   
Sources: Al-Baseir, 2003; Government of Yemen, (website); and World Bank. 2003 
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In Malawi, in principle the selection of project type is also made at the district level in 
consultation with traditional leaders using Participatory Rural Appraisal methodologies.   In 
practice, however, there were variations among the project sites, with some communities 
claiming that they were not consulted on the type of project while others reported that the projects 
were already requested by the communities even before being informed of MASAF funding.  The 
project sites in the latter group had few implementation problems compared with the former.  
Once the poverty-stricken EPAs have been identified, the selection of projects is done through the 
District Assembly structures.  If the poverty-stricken EPAs do not have projects on the District 
Assembly approved list that qualify for funding under the MASAF PWP, the request for such 
projects from the community is to be made through the District Assembly via the Area 
Development Committee and the Village Development Committee.  This procedure was adopted 
because it was thought it would ensure adequate consultation between communities and their 
traditional leaders. 
 
In India community involvement was  least developed in all previous versions of 
workfare.  However, in the most recent 100-day employment guarantee scheme, communities are 
sought to be involved in project selection.  In Korea an interesting procedure was followed.  It 
was stipulated that 50% of the projects were to be selected by communities (demand-driven) and 
the balance of 50% are to be selected by line Departments (supply-driven).  Thus there is an 
interesting mix of both supply and demand-driven approaches. (Subbarao 1999) 
3.3.  Financing and other implementation arrangements 
There is much variation across countries on who finances and who implements (executes) 
programs.  In this respect, the term “public works” is actually misleading inasmuch as it gives the 
impression that it is entirely a government-funded and government-implemented program.  That 
is not the case. In a number of countries one finds public-private-donor partnership in the 
financing and running of the program.   
 
  Subbarao et al. (1997) examine the characteristics of alternative delivery methods of 
social assistance programs, with focus on PWPs, based on program experiences.  Depending on 
the entity who undertakes the funding and management of the program (service provision) and 
the actual creation of the infrastructure  (the  production), two general approaches  can be 
identified: the first is a traditional delivery model (where government takes on both provision and 
production); and the second includes delivery models in which provisions and production are  
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carried out by a combination of Governments, private and donors.  Thus, we can distinguish four 
delivery mechanisms: a) the traditional model (financed and implemented by the government); b) 
Government financed and implemented by others; c) Government and donors financed and 
implemented by others; and d) financed by donors and implemented by governments or donors. 
 
  The most common model in our sample is the ‘traditional’ one, where government both 
finances and runs the PWP (12  out of 37), followed by the combination  of donors and 
government as funding agencies and either government or others as implementers (11 out of 37).  
An interesting finding is that the traditional model typically characterizes PWP in upper-middle 
income countries, while the combination of different actors seems to typify low income countries 
(Figure 14).    According to the information available, as the level of income increases, the 
government is able to finance and implement a PWP on its own.  Low income countries often do 
not have the financial, technical, and managerial capacities to launch and run a PWP, which 
explains their reliance on donors and/or NGOs for both funding and implementation.   
 
Figure 14:  Funding and implementing arrangements by income group 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on various sources of information.  Note: this 
analysis is based on 30 countries implementing a total of 37 PWPs. 
 
In Figure 15 the regional pattern of implementation (regardless of funding), is analyzed. 
Some regional pattern is visible. Not surprisingly, workfare programs in South and East Asia are 
mostly run by the government as part of overall poverty reduction strategy; while in SSA other 
entities such as bilateral donors, NGOs, SF, private contractors, are responsible for running the 
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Regardless of the pattern of the arrangement, a number of problems in implementation 
have arisen in different country settings.  These can be classified into 4 groups (a) arrangements 
relating to financial flows, (b) availability of funds for non-wage expenses, (c) weak capacity 
especially in dovetailing managerial, technical and labor inputs at the actual project 
implementation site and the role of contractors; and (d) political economy factors.  These are 
discussed below. 
 
Figure 15:  Implementing institution, by region (35 PWPs in 29 countries) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on various sources of information.   
Note: this analysis is based on 30 countries implementing a total of 37 PWPs. 
    
Financial flows and payment delays:   
In countries which are decentralized, typically a part of the funds are allocated by the 
central (federal) government, to be supplemented  by counterpart funds from provincial 
governments.  Both these sources of funds have to reach the project sites in villages at the right 
time.  In many countries such a convergence of financial flows has proven difficult.  For example, 
in India, central government finances have to move from New Delhi to districts where these funds 
have to be matched by funds released by state governments.  And from the districts the combined 
sources of funds have to move to villages where a workfare project is being implemented.  In 
practice, often enormous delays occurred and actually funds are released from the center during 
the last quarter of the financial year which incidentally happens to be agriculturally busiest season 
when there is little need for a workfare program.  The result has been low off take of the program 
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The implementation of a PWP generally involves several activities, including managing 
the flows of funding, selection of projects, supervision, quality assurance, monitoring, reporting 
and evaluation.  When multiple agencies are designated to carry out these activities, coordination 
problems may arise causing delays in payment of workers.   For instance, the public works 
component of a donors-funded emergency project in Zambia reported a mixed implementation 
performance due to substantial delays in payment of contractors who in turn delayed payment of 
wages. In particular, delays were caused by poor coordination among the several institutions 
involved in the multiple layers of disbursement and approval
22
 
, exacerbated by a lack of 
proactivity (World Bank, 2006). The result was that payments were not always made at the 
critical time when people needed to buy food and other essential goods and services, 
compromising the many goal of the emergency workfare. 
  In Afghanistan, due to the absence of an efficient financial system, payments in the 
Labour Intensive Works Programme (LIWP) were terribly delayed, causing implementing 
agencies to stop working for a time, and laborers received their payments sometime only after 
three months after projects were completed (Johnson, 2004). 
 
Non-wage funds   
Non wage funds are crucial for the success of the project, but not always they are made 
available.  In some low income countries of Africa the wage cost is borne by donors who expect 
the non-wage cost to be borne by the recipient country.  Such a counterpart contribution is 
insisted for understandable reasons to elicit ownership by countries.   However, in countries such 
as Ethiopia, in all public works prior to the Productive Safety Nets Program (PSNP) launched in 
2004, the non-wage cost could not be borne by the recipient country with the result the program 
could not be implemented, and the available wage funds were disbursed to poor households 
without really implementing any program (Smith and Subbarao, 2003).  The PSNP addressed this 
deficiency. 
In other cases the efforts are made to insure availability of adequate funding even at times 
of increase of basic inputs.  This was the case of Yemen in 2005, when the prices of input 
                                                 
22 To illustrate, the public works component had a tripartite arrangement where the Ministry of Local Government and 
Housing certified the works after inspection, the National Road Fund Agency (NRFA) was responsible for channeling 
of funds while the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) in the Office of the Vice President was responsible for 
disbursement and overall management. The signing of certificates was often delayed because works had to be inspected 
before payment could be made. Moreover, the PIU could not disburse before NRFA properly accounted for previous 
disbursement. This arrangement resulted in delayed reporting, delayed disbursement and delayed payment of wages. 
Some wages remained unpaid for months to an extent which cannot be explained by cash flow problems on the special 
account.  (World Bank, 2006).  
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materials like steel, cement, fuel, and wages increased significantly by 60% to 100%.  As a result 
the number of subprojects that could be financed under the project was reduced substantially. 
Later on the World Bank provided additional financing to the project to cover the increase in the 
cost of inputs to achieve the original targets (World Bank 2007 PID). 
 
Weak capacity and the role of contractors   
Implementation of a workfare program requires convergence of technical, managerial and 
labor inputs at the work site. Since the government capacity to accomplish such a convergence of 
inputs is weak, often contractors are hired to implement the program.  This has led to two 
problems: (i) sometimes agencies providing the funding neither   enforce the design of the 
program nor do they have any interest in enforcing them since they are accountable, not to the 
client, but to their respective state governments. (ii) Contractors may bring their own labor and 
not employ laborers from areas close to  the project site for whose benefit the program was 
initiated in the first place.  This was evident in HIMO projects in Rwanda where contractors 
brought their own laborers and paid them below the stipulated minimum wage.   
 
In India too, the implementation through private contractors led to severe problems.  The 
dovetailing of responsibility for implementing the program to locally elected bodies (the 
Panchayat Raj institutions in India) did not help mitigate hurdles in implementation because of 
weak accountability in the system as a whole.  In the examination of the functioning of the Food-
for-Work program in the Indian State of Andrah Pradesh, Deshingkar et al. (2005)
23
 
 show that the 
involvement of contractors in the execution of the projects (which were meant to have no role in 
the execution) excluded the very poor and the lower caste and generated the incentive to use 
(clandestinely) labor-displacing machinery. In fact, the study sites they encountered the use of 
Poclains (a kind of excavator).  Arguably the use of these technologies was an effort to maximize 
the efficiency and therefore the resources flowing into the local works projects as well as the 
result of the pressure by line department staff to complete the works in a short time, but the net 
result has been lower benefits to workers. 
Political economy of local government involvement   
In  countries  where the implementation of public works has been delegated to local 
elected governments it is important to strengthen accountability and to build their capacity for 
monitoring and supervision.  In India, for example, the process of decentralization meant that the 
                                                 
23 Drawing upon a fieldwork conducted in 2001-2002 in six villages in the Indian State of Andhra Pradesh.   
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implementation responsibility for workfare now rests with the locally elected bodies known as 
Panchayat Raj institutions (PRIs).  Unfortunately most PRIs lacked the capacity to implement 
programs.  As a result line department officials continue to have a strong influence in program 
implementation, which often generate opportunities for leakages.  Political influence as well as 
bureaucratic meddling often led to selection of projects which have no benefit to the local 
community.      
 
A recent study (Dev et. al. 2007) examining some aspects of the functioning of social 
safety nets programs (including PWPs) in three states of India, viz. Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and 
Karnataka, revealed significant differences in the functioning of PRI across the three states.  
Respondents in the state of Karnataka approached the PRI institutions for gaining access to safety 
net programs generally, whereas in other states there is much less resort to PRI institutions by 
poor households due to lack of confidence in these institutions.  It is possible PRI institutions may 
have taken a keener interest in the implementation of the new program of employment guarantee 
introduced in 2006, given strong commitment both by the center and the states.  
The above survey suggests that a number of issues need to be addressed before floating a 
workfare program.  It is important to strengthen accountability at all stages in the implementation 
process.  This can be achieved with program and process monitoring and social audits (see 
section VI below).  The delays in the release of funds must also be avoided to maintain trust and 
schedule. 
3.4.  Asset creation and maintenance 
  Maintaining the assets created and sustaining the workfare intervention are important 
issues generally not addressed in most public workfare projects.  Sustainability problems were 
evident in 15 of the 60 infrastructure projects reviewed.  Most assets (primarily some heavily 
used roads) were not being adequately maintained.  This neglect can be attributed in large part to 
the lack of a sense of local ownership of the projects, since community involvement in project 
planning and design was not actively sought (e.g., Morocco workfare project).  Even where, after 
the completion of the asset, the local communities are involved in their maintenance through the 
local communities' presidents, the unavailability of resources prevents them from maintaining the 
projects. 
 
In fact in most projects no practical arrangements were put in place to ensure 
maintenance nor were beneficiaries assigned the responsibility for that task. In the Zambia public  
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works project, maintenance and sustainability of the public works program was unlikely, because 
the project did not establish a framework for periodic maintenance of secondary and tertiary roads 
by the community or local authorities.  The roads and bridges constructed have not yet been 
mapped and gazetted and there are no arrangements in place to ensure that this will happen. 
These facilities need to be comprehensively mapped, inspected and gazetted in order for the 
Government to maintain and rehabilitate them in the future.  Alternatively, no efforts were made 
by the Government to assist the communities in setting-up local maintenance committees who 
could draw money from a Road Maintenance Fund to ensure sustainability.  Interestingly, 
communities were given some training in maintenance of the assets, but communities are unlikely 
to engage in systematic maintenance without adequate financial provision and some guidance. In 
Afghanistan, most public works projects were roads.  Significant benefits ensued following the 
construction of roads including especially cutting travel time and costs. Unfortunately, however, 
the constructed roads were already beginning to deteriorate because of lack of maintenance. 
 
In Egypt, public works program under the Social Fund for Development (SFD) began to 
address maintenance problems in 1999, by requesting that 'sponsoring agencies' (Governorates) 
deposit up-front 10 percent of total project costs for maintenance purposes in a separate bank 
account, matched by an additional 10 percent from the SFD.  This was based on best practice 
experiences from other Social Investment Funds in other parts of the world.  However, these 
funds were rarely accessed due to the inability of Governorates to prepare adequate maintenance 
plans.  This suggests that when even adequate financial planning and provision is made, there is 
no  guarantee that maintenance work will be undertaken.  In 2004, tripartite arrangements 
(between the governorates, NGOs and stakeholders) were reached in two governorates to define 
the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders and began hiring local contractors to carry out 
periodic maintenance of roads, sanitation and potable water projects and canals.  Lessons learned 
from this pilot will be taken into account as SFD has plans to scale up this maintenance scheme in 
the country's 26 Governorates.  
 
There are exceptions.  In Yemen, for example, building of schools was an important 
activity undertaken by public workfare. Schools allocated certain portion of school fees to meet 
operational or maintenance costs.  In Tanzania public works program, communities have 
developed strategies to make sure that the created assets are maintained.  Communities have 
formed various community groups depending on the type of created asset.  For example, there are 
water committees, school communities and health boards.  The government also allocated funds  
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to cater for repair of assets and the funds were channeled through the local government 
authorities.  The local government authorities also provided expert advice to communities.  
 
  Thus, the experience of countries differs a great deal with respect to maintenance of 
assets.  In general, where advance preparation has been made and provisions were incorporated in 
the design of the project intervention including financial provision and community committees 
were formed with specially assigned roles and responsibilities, the created assets were 
maintained.  Where there was no such advance preparation and provision, assets could not be 
maintained.   
 
In sum, three aspects need to be kept in mind in the choice of assets:  (a) whether or not 
the assets created are productive, (b) whether or not the created assets are maintained, and (c) 
whether or not the benefits from created assets actually go to the poor.   
3.5.  Cross-country patterns 
What is the association between income level of the countries, objectives of the programs 
and other characteristics  of the programs?  If we manage  to know which set of factors are 
associated with workfare programs in different country contexts we could then explain the 
prevalence or the absence of public works programs, depending on the country circumstances.  
Thus enabling one to form a judgment to whether or not a public works intervention is a good 
option under given country circumstances 
 
We  used cluster analysis to discern the patterns of association between programs’ 
objective and features and country level of income
24
 
.  The data used included two subsets of the 
database available containing information from 32, public works programs implemented during 
the past 20 years in 27 countries and described in the appendix 2 and 3.  First we conduct the 
analysis using the observations on the countries and programs that have more variables and 
description of features.  Then we conduct the same analysis using more countries and programs, 
albeit fewer variables and information on the features of the programs.  
                                                 
24 A possible drawback of this cluster method is the so-called chaining phenomenon because clusters may be forced 
together due to single elements being close to each other, even though many of the elements in each cluster may be 
very distant to each other.  To prevent such drawback, the cluster analysis here accounts for the intra-clusters 
correlation among the elements instead of the standard Euclidean distance.  
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The results show some interesting association between type of objectives, level of income 
and level of labor intensity, mostly along similar income level.  The analysis for 14 programs, out 
of the 32 in the total sample, for which we have info on income level, project identification, wage 
level, objective, funding agency,  labor intensity and targeting,  identifies 2 big clusters of 
countries (Figure 16)




Zambia, and Malawi), which have programs with high level of labor intensity with antipoverty 
objectives and guaranteed income in case of unemployment.  The second cluster includes low and 
middle income countries (Yemen, Peru (urban and rural), Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Madagascar 
and Argentina jefes) that use public works mostly for responding to covariate shocks and employ 
medium level labor intensity. Note also that within the second cluster, Yemen and Peru Rural 
form a small subgroup not directly associated with other countries.  The main reason being that 
both programs are implemented at community level. 




                                                 
25 The clusters are presented as Dendrograms that is a tree diagram frequently used to illustrate the arrangement of the 
clusters produced by a clustering algorithm. 
26 Note that in the case of India we combined the JRY, NREGA and MEGS programs under one program because they 
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When using the larger sample with 32 public works programs the structure of the main 
clusters, reported in Figure 17, remain essentially unchanged.  This time, though, the additional 
variables (program features) considered allow to form additional smaller clusters within the two 
main clusters that have been identified before.  The two main clusters go from Zambia to Egypt 
and from Yemen to Indonesia.  Again, countries that feature programs with antipoverty 
objectives, combining self targeting with other methods are clustered together.  The exceptions 
here are Slovenia and Poland that are upper middle income countries that had implemented 
programs to help population to be reintegrated in the labor market. But as with many anti poverty 
programs they had the government as the implementing agency.   
 
Secondly, middle income countries from Uruguay to Indonesia, such as Argentina, 
Uruguay, Mexico and Colombia are more likely to implement public works to respond to 
covariate shocks. Madagascar and Bangladesh FFW do have special features that place them 
alone in the diagram.  It may be worth noticing that all programs where communities have a key 
role in identifying the projects to be undertaken are in the first big cluster (Ethiopia, Malawi 
MASAF, Somalia ACF, Yemen, Egypt, and Peru Rural). 
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The patters that emerge from the cluster analysis are very clear and provide some 
useful indications for countries interested in using public works programs.  Important 
lessons can be derived from the experiences of countries with similar level of income and 
need in the design of public works programs from setting the right objectives to the 
design features. 
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IV.  Monitoring and evaluation of Public Works programs – Lessons from experiences  
  Strong monitoring systems are necessary to support credible program evaluations and 
to provide feedback for improvements in productivity, effectiveness, and impact.  Evaluation 
of public works are necessary to: a) provide feedback during the life of the program to help 
improve their effectiveness; b) making projects accountable to the public; and c) help inform 
government decisions about spending allocations.  Despite their value, effective M&E systems 
for public works programs have been rare.  This section illustrates the need to design of a good 
M&E framework with one good practice example from Ethiopia, followed by a discussion of 
monitoring indicators relevant for public works program and concludes with an overview of 
findings from available evaluations of public works programs.  
 
4.1  Design of an M&E: An example from Ethiopia 
The PSNP in Ethiopia provides an illustration on how to set up a good M&E framework 
in a low income country, clearly delineating objectives and indicators of output and outcomes 
related to the public works component, and its indicators.  A more general outline of possible 
indicators to be used for public works program is reported in the Appendix 1.  As can be seen in 
Table 5 the list of outcomes reflects the overall objectives of the program and might need to rely 
on other components of the project and other programs beyond the public works itself. 
 
Table 5:  Outcome and Output Indicators for the PSNP Public Works component in 
Ethiopia 
 
Objective  Indicators 
Outcomes 
Chronically food-insecure households 
have ensured food consumption during 
the program period 
• Percentage of program beneficiaries who report 12 months of food 
access from all sources including the program 
• Average number of months of household food shortages covered 
by the program 
Household assets protected 
(households’ short-term vulnerability to 
shocks reduced) 
• Percentage of the average change in asset levels of chronically food-insecure 
households 
• Percentage of households reporting distress sales of assets 
• Percentage of households reporting consumption of seed stocks 
Community assets used productively 
and managed in a sustainable manner 
• Percentage of households reporting satisfaction or direct benefits from the 
community assets developed 
• Percentage of households regularly using three or more community assets 
developed by the program 
• Percentage of public works for which an ongoing management mechanism has 
been established  
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Outputs 
Public works Beneficiaries   
Appropriate payments (food and/or 
cash) delivered to targeted 
beneficiaries in a timely and predictable 
manner 
•  Percentage of participants receiving food and/or cash resources per month versus 
the planned number supposed to receive food and/or cash 
•  Percentage of food and/or cash delivered per month versus the amount that was 
planned to have been delivered 
•  Percentage of districts completing 70% of distributions by end July 
Targeting undertaken according to 
established procedures 
•  Percentage of community members who understand targeting criteria 
Community assets    
Appropriate and good quality public 
works constructed 
•  Number of public works constructed, including kilometers of roads constructed or 
maintained per targeted district 
•  Number of structures constructed per targeted district (health posts, classrooms, 
grain stores, market structures, latrines) 
•  Percentage of public works that conform to established standards 
Management systems for community 
assets established 
•  Percentage of communities with guidelines or bylaws developed for the 
management and protection of community assets 
•  Number of visits to sites by a technical task force team per district per year 
•  Percentage of local, district, and regional monitoring reports on actual versus 
planned activities delivered on time 
•  Percentage of districts where the M&E plan is fully understood and implemented 
Source: Adapted from Grosh et al, 2008 and Food Security Coordination Bureau (2004) –  
 
 
Administrative capability and training and type of infrastructure available will determine the 
success of the M&E plan and ultimately of the program. In Ethiopia, for example, Government 
staff at the local level collects monitoring data using standardized forms.  The information is then 
compiled and summarized at the district, regional, and federal levels where are converted into 
electronic form.   The system aimed for simplicity to account for the low capacity of the 
program’s frontline units.  However, implementation of the monitoring plan encountered 
numerous logistical obstacles due to lack of local staff, the poor qualifications and high turnover 
of existing staff, and the poor infrastructure in some districts (for example, about 20 percent 
lacked electricity).  
 
To generate a minimum amount of monitoring data, a number of solutions were devised.  
These included: a) collection of basic completion and disbursement data via telephone from  
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around 80 districts on a twice-weekly basis; b) the formation of a small team at federal level in 
charge or conducting spot checks; c) a system of roving audits to investigate compliance with 
financial rules, disbursements and payments, and appeals and complaints; and d) a system for on-
site reviewing a sample of  80 public works projects twice a year to investigate both the quality of 
planning and implementation.    In the meantime, the program further simplified its monitoring 
system and invested more in training. 
 
4.2.  Key elements for Monitoring Public works Programs 
To monitor public works program’s effectiveness, it is important to clearly define the 
indicators and tracking them over time towards the targets.  From an operations point of view, 
the MIS provides the cornerstone for an effective monitoring system.  However it is important to 
stress that the main purpose of MIS is not monitoring, but to provide information that help 
programs to carry out the many transactions needed to run them.  Its fundamental purpose, 
thus, is to ensure that each function is carried out correctly for each client. 
 
Key indicators include input and output indicators, described in more details in 
Appendix 2, and outcome indicators.  Box 2 provides an illustration of core definitions of 
outputs used in South Africa public works project.   
 
Box 2.  Summary of Core Definitions for Monitoring Purposes in the South Africa 
Expanded Public Works Program 
 
Person-days of Employment Created 
The number of people who worked on a project x the number of days each person worked. 
 
Job Opportunities 
1 job opportunity = paid work created for an individual on an EPWP project for any period of time. In the 
case of social sector projects, learnerships will also constitute job opportunities. T he same individual can 
be employed on different projects and each period of employment will be counted as a job opportunity. 
 
Project Wage 
Minimum Daily Wage Rate = daily wage (whether task-rated or time-rated) per individual project.  This 
wage rate must be inserted in the Project tender document as per the EPWP Guidelines. 
 
Training Person-Days 
A formal EPWP training course has been arranged by the Dept. of Labour.  The number of training person-
days attending this course or modules of this course must be captured.  
For Other Training 1 training day = at least 7 hours of formal training.  The number of Training Person-
days is the number of people who attended training x the number of days of training. 
 
A distinction must be made between accredited and non-accredited training person-days. 
 
Project Budget  
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The project budget = the price tendered by the contractor + the professional fees for the professional service 
provider appointed to design and supervise the project. 
The project budget excludes government management & administration costs. 
 
Actual Expenditure 
Actual expenditure = the expenditure on the project by the contractor + the expenditure by the professional 
service provider appointed to design and supervise the project. 
The actual expenditure excludes expenditure on government management & administration. 
 
Demographic Characteristics of Workers 
The number of workers that fall within the following categories must be recorded: 
-  Youth (i.e. 18 – 35 years of age) 
-  Women 
-  People with disabilities 
 
Source:  adapted from Government of South Africa: Department of Public Works.  2005.  Framework for Monitoring 
and Evaluation of the Expanded Public Works Programme 
 
Outcome indicators   
Outcome indicators should provide information necessary to evaluate if the program has 
met its objectives.  Examples include the income of workers, their working prospects and the 
economic impact of projects on the community.  Process and efficiency indicators provide info on 
the intermediate impact of the projects, such as location of projects, the quality of the work done 
and the use by community, characteristics of workers, their transaction cost and the beneficiaries 
experience with the payment. 
 
Unfortunately outcome indicators are not collected very often for public works program, 
especially in poor countries.   In MSAF project in Malawi the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
system were not able to track outcome indicators, because of the poor linkages between the M&E 
system with poverty monitoring activities by the Ministry of Planning and Economic 
Development.  Consequently, outcome indicators that were included in the design of the project 
were not collected, making it relatively difficult to measure the impact of the Project on the 
beneficiaries/beneficiary communities. (Workd Bank, 2004 -MASAF ICR)  
 
When  process  indicators  are collected they can  capture the program’s overall cost-
effectiveness, or the efficiency of a subset of program operations.  The example in Table 8, from 
a study in Madagascar (Van Imschoot, 2006), shows the implication for using public works with 
high labor intensive (HLI)  techniques compared to other standard methods to build 
infrastructures, like semi-mechanized and high mechanized intensive (HLI) techniques.  The table 
shows that the cost of building infrastructures using HLI is much lower than using more 
mechanized method of construction.   
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Table 6:  Comparison of costs by execution methods and  
types of infrastructure in Madagascar 
Infrastructure 
Categories   Roads  Buildings  Irrigated Zones   Urban 
Roads  
Execution 








HMI  HLI  HMI  HLI 
Total Labor  
 
Direct labor 





























financed  49.9%  60.8%  71%  56.3%  59.1%  76.3%  46.7%  73.1%  28.4% 
Local materials   15.6%  9.8%  8.1%  33.6%  19.3%  3.4%  37.7%  2.6%  40.6% 


















Source:    “Comparative study of the different approaches used for various types of basic infrastructure work in 
Madagascar,” Marc Van Imschoot, September 2006.  
 
 
4.3.  Evaluations set up and results 
More and more public works programs are currently been evaluated thoroughly, filling an 
existing gap. Programs in India, Argentina, Peru, South Africa, and Yemen, among others have 
been evaluated in depth.  The reasons for the lack of evaluations vary from the temporary nature 
of the programs, to the difficulty of defining the objective of the evaluation and the difficulty of 
collecting data.  Three types of evaluations can be distinguished: process evaluation, assessment 
of targeting efficiency, and impact evaluation.  
Process evaluation 
The objective of process evaluation is  to find out if the program is  implemented as 
designed.  An illustrative list of questions that can be addressed by the process evaluation is listed 
in Figure 18.  
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Figure 18:  Example of questions for process evaluation 
 
•  At management level 
o  Who is implementing the projects?  
  Oversight – Local gov, Engineers… 
  Use of contractors  
o  Is the program well organized 
o  Are resources allocated according to plan 
  Are they tracked properly and delivered efficiently 
 
•  At project level 
o  Are projects completed on time and up to specification? 
o  What is the actual number of people being hired?   
  Less? More than expected? 
o  What is the wage respect to the local wage and rules?  
  If not self-targeting, what are the other selection processes employed? 
 
•  Beneficiaries participation 
o  How did they hear about the program? 
o  Are they beneficiaries coming from local communities?  
o  Are people being paid on time? 
o  Are the working conditions appropriate? 
o  Are there any accommodations for female participants? 
 
Source: Adapted from Grosh et al. 2008 
 
 
The information needed for process evaluation can be collected from several sources 
including: a) administrative records; b) interviews with implementation staff, program officials; 
c) focus groups interviews; and d) beneficiary surveys. 
 
Somalia’s CFW project provides a good example of the use of beneficiary surveys.  The 
project organized post-distribution monitoring (PDM) of the distributed cash or vouchers two 
weeks after payment.  Structured household surveys were conducted with approximately 10 per 
cent of beneficiaries to assess the level of satisfaction among beneficiaries and to evaluate 
whether the project had met its objectives (Mattinen and Ogden, 2006).  Semi-structured focus 
group discussions and interviews with key informants were also planned, but remained extremely 
limited and sporadic. 
 
The examples of existing assessments of implementation processes that are available do 
not cover the questions we have listed above.  However, a few recent reports give some idea of 
the parameters under considerations.    In Egypt, the  2004 MDRM II (World Bank 2006a; 
Government of Egypt, Social Fund for Development, 2004)  provides  an assessment  of the  
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efficiency of the project and the cost of the job created.  The document describes the efficiency of 
PWP to be quite good, given the country context and in comparison to other infrastructure service 
providers operating in the country.   The  conclusions are obtained by tracking the average 
expenditures per job created (which includes the expenditure per beneficiary and related inputs 
and management costs) and the average expenditure per beneficiary.  During the third phase of 
the project (1999 – mid 2006), the expenditure per job created was equal to L.E.211 (US$37) per 
man/month for PWP and it has been decreasing since the first phase of the project.  The average 
expenditure per beneficiary during the third phase was L.E.49 (US$8.6) for the public works 
component.  It decreased sharply in the second phase (1997-2000) compared to the first phase 
(1993-1997), and rose again during the third phase, although when taking into account inflation 
the expenditures have remained fairly stable over the past two phases. 
 
In Madagascar, a recent study (Andrianjaka, and Milazzo, 2008) collected information on 
the number of workers  employed, days worked, and  wage rates across several projects 
implemented by different agencies.  This analysis helped to make a comparison across projects 
with different objectives in terms of labor intensity.  The results show that labor intensity for 
projects designed to address labor needs following natural disasters was around 80 percent, while 
those project aimed at building small infrastructures and implemented by ILO had a labor 
intensity of less than 40 percent.  The information on local market wage rates pointed out that 
paid wages were higher than local wages, with the result that more people participated to the 
projected using a rotation system.   
 
This example illustrates the trade-off existing in a situation where in a given location 
there are too many persons demanding a temporary job in public works, but the available 
resources are limited and not sufficient to include all of them in the program, two options emerge.  
The first is to adjust the wage rate at a higher level and include a larger number of workers on a 
rotation bases for a few days each.  The second is to adjust the wage level at a lower level and 
include a smaller number of workers, willing to work at a lower wage, for more days each.  
Evaluations that throw light on Targeting/Incidence  
The key question that targeting/incidence evaluation is trying to answer is if the program 
is reaching the people that wanted to reach.  This question can be addressed in two important 
ways.  The first deals with the location of the projects.  Public works projects are location 
specific, therefore well targeted public works should be located in the areas where there are more 
poor people and where they are more likely to be in need of short term employment.  The second  
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deals with the actual participation of poor people to public works projects.  In this case the 




required to rank participants according to their standard of living and thus assess the effectiveness 
of the targeting provided by the wage rate or additional screening mechanisms.   
There are not many studies that assessed the location of public works projects.  Public 
works projects are not always located in poor areas.  Sometimes, this happens because poor areas 
are less accessible and more difficult to work in.  In South Africa, for example, Adato and Haddad 
(2001) find that some districts with high levels of poverty and unemployment had no public works 
projects, while others with low levels of poverty had benefited from several.  When location of 
projects follows a poverty map, like in Peru’s Trabajar Rural, instead, the allocation of 90 percent of 
the projects takes place in the districts in the bottom forty percent of poverty distribution 
(FOCONDES, 2003).  However, non poor areas too may house some non poor households.  Thus 
it is not entirely justified to exclude non poor areas from the purview of public works.   
 
The assessment of the incidence of participation of the poor is often focused on the 
comparison of poverty status of actual participants versus non participants.  This is usually done 
using current household surveys sometimes in combination with ad hoc surveys that contain 
enough information on the level of income (consumption) of the households of the beneficiaries.  
Specific surveys are particularly necessary to capture program beneficiaries when programs do 
not reach a large number of beneficiaries.  When beneficiary survey of the participants are 
collected, the challenge is to define a benchmark for the defining the level of income 
(consumption) of the beneficiaries.  This can be done by comparing the characteristics of the 
beneficiaries in the new surveys with existing survey when they are available.  Of course one has 
to use the same type of for the variables that are used for benchmark.  If a survey is not available, 
then a new survey has to be designed to capture the characteristics of the reference population. 
 
The few available evaluations made show that when properly designed public works have 
been able to reach poorer households.  In Argentina, 80 percent of  the beneficiaries to the 
Trabajar program in 1997 came from the poorest 20 percent of households in Argentina (Jalan 
                                                 
27To be  comprehensive, a consumption indicator should capture all its components, such as food, nonfood, and 
services, as well as the value of goods produced and consumed by the household and the imputed value of durables or 
the rental value of an owner-occupied dwelling. Similarly, a comprehensive income indicator will cover the incomes 
earned by all household members from formal and informal sources and the value of goods produced and consumed by 
the household (Grosh et al, 2008). For guidance on constructing a consumption-based welfare measure, see Deaton and 
Zaidi (2002). For guidance on constructing an income-based welfare measure, see Eurostat (2003).  
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and Ravallion 1999, Coady, Grosh Hoddinott, 2004).  Similarly the incidence analysis of the 
Jefes (Heads of Household) Program shows that the share of Program participants among the 40 
percent better-off households in Argentina was only 6 percent in 2005 while the share of Program 
benefits going to the bottom two quintiles was 80 percent. (Lindert et al., 2006).  In Ethiopia, 
those that participated in public works had higher income and level of assets than those that 
received direct support, but less than those that did not participate any of the two programs (Table 
9) (World Bank 2007- Ethiopia PSNP, ICR, Targeting.)  Research by Lanjouw and Ravallion 
(1998) shows that the poorest quintile is well served by public works programs in India  Recent 
research carried out in three states of India has confirmed the strong pro-poor bias of public 
workfare program in comparison with other safety net programs (Dev, Subbarao, Galab and Ravi,   
2007)  
 
Table 7:  Household characteristics of PSNP beneficiaries and non Beneficiaries in Ethiopia 
Economic Characteristics  Direct support  Public Works  Non-PSNP HH 
Annual HH income (birr)  690  1,587  1,949 
Total Asset value (birr)  320  846  1,471 
HH owing land (%)  75.4  88.8  88.2 
Land cultivated (ha)  .47  .64  .98 
Source: Devereux, Stephen, Rachel Sabates-Wheeler, Mulugeta Tefera, and Hailemichael Taye. 2006.  
 
 
The targeting performance of the Trabajar program in Peru shows a difference in 
targeting outcome between the urban and rural programs.  The estimates obtained using national 
quintiles show that the rural program is better because the rural population is overrepresented 
among the poor (FONCODES. 2003; World Bank. 2005. “PERU).  Nonetheless, both programs 
do a good targeting job given that most of the participants (80 percent in rural areas and 75 
percent in urban areas) are in the bottom 40 percetile of the population.  In contrast the JPS Padat 
Karya program in Indonesia had a very high wage and reached those affected by the financial crisis 
and not necessarily those more poor (Pritchett, Sumarto, and Suryahadi 2002; Sumarto, Suryahadi, 
and Pritchett 2000).   However, the program in Indonesia was not necessarily poorly targeted 
because it reached the segment of the intended population.  At a time of crises, those poor people 
that had a source of income did not participated, but the program was able to prevent further loss of 
consumption and assets for those that lost income because of the crises.   
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Impact evaluations  
The  evaluation of public works programs should help to determine the impact of a 
program on the intended target groups.  First of all, evaluations should assess if programs are able 
to raise the income of poor beneficiaries to help them to smooth their consumption and eventually 
reduce the level of poverty in the country. Secondary objectives such as providing skills 
development to unemployed or women should also be assessed in case they are explicit objectives 
of the programs.  Lastly, evaluations should also  assess if the infrastructures and services 
provided by the programs have an impact on the life of the communities.  
 
The techniques for evaluation include randomization or experimental design; quasi-
experiments such as matching, or double differences; and  non-experimental  or instrumental 
variable methods. A full discussion of these various techniques is beyond the scope of this paper.  
An overview of these techniques with illustrations to public works programs is available in Grosh 
et. al. (2009).  Here we illustrate below findings of recent impact evaluations of public works 
programs.  
 
Direct impact on beneficiaries 
Several studies found that public works programs had a positive impact on the 
beneficiaries, at least in the short term.  In Colombia Empleo in Accion, participants showed an 
increase in the numbers of hours of over 35 percent (from 23.7 hours per week to 33.3) and an 
increase of 9 percent in the total consumption of the households.  Hoverer the increase in the 
consumption of food items like milk of meat was much higher (42 and 28 percent respectively) 
(Departamento Nacional de Planeacion, Colombia, 2004), though such increases is a regular 
pattern observed in all transfer programs, and so not unique to public works.   
 
In addition, qualitative evaluation shows that the PSNP in Ethiopia has had a positive 
effect on the well-being of beneficiaries.  Analysis shows that 60 percent were less likely to sell 
assets to buy food in 2005 and 30 percent enrolled more of their children in school.  Moreover, 
almost half the beneficiaries surveyed stated that they used healthcare facilities more in 2005/06 
than in 2004/05.  Interestingly most of the beneficiaries attributed those changes to their 
participation in the program (Devereux et al., 2006). 
 
An important challenge is to define clearly the outcome of interest and how to measure it 
taking into account the influence of other factors. If the main outcome to be measured is the  
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increase in the income of the households of the beneficiaries as a result of the wage rate (in cash 
and/or food) received, the analysis needs to take into account the transaction cost (transport etc.) 
as well as lost opportunities to work.  The marginal increase of income tends to be less than the 
level of transfer, which implies that in the absence of this program, the beneficiaries could have 
received some income from participating in informal jobs.  When this forgone income is deducted 
from the public works wage, the marginal income transfer will be lower than the wage income 
received from the program.  However, it is worth stressing that while the net wage income gain 
for the participant may be lower than the wage, the gains to the society may not be lower, since, 
in a situation of high unemployment, some other person in the country would fill in the job 
vacated by the participant to the public works program.   
 
In the case of Peru, Chacaltana (2003) found that the net gain derived from the program 
was equal to 24 percent of the nominal transfer.  Beneficiaries received a monthly salary of 300 
soles, while their control group was able to generate 227 soles on their own, in absence of the 
program.  In the Jefes program in Argentina in 2002, the net income benefit (after taking into 
account foregone income of the participant), was estimated as two-thirds of the AR$150.00 
benefit. This net income benefit decreased to one-third of the transfer by May 2003 (Galasso and 
Ravallion, 2004, and Galasso, 2004).  In the Empleo in Action in Columbia, the increase in the 
monthly employment income of the participants in the program was on average close to 39 
percent on income that would be earned without a program, but was much higher for women and 
youths between 18 and 25 years old (90 percent for women and 54 percent for young people 
(Departamento Nacional de Planeacion, Colombia, 2004).  
 
Another challenge is to calculate the longer term impact of the program on poor people, 
such as being able to smooth consumption over the difficult periods, rebuild critical assets, 
finding permanent source of income, and ultimately getting out of poverty.  Achieving those 
outcomes not only depends on the individuals participating to the program, but also on the other 
members of the households and might take longer time to achieve.  Thus, this type of evaluation 
requires additional data, such as longitudinal household survey that follow beneficiaries over 
time, and adequate techniques.   Very few evaluations have addressed this issue. 
 
In Argentina in the 2002-2003 period, the Heads of Household Program precluded 10 
percent of the beneficiaries from falling into extreme poverty (see Galasso and Ravallion, 2004, 
and Galasso, 2004) and was instrumental in tilting the overall distribution of income changes at  
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reported in Figure 19, show that while all non participants had negative income growth over the 
2002-3 period, beneficiaries in the low income percentiles showed positive income growth over 
the same period.   
Figure 19:  Growth Incidence Curves, 2002-2003 (Argentina)  
 
Source:  The World Bank (2005b). Argentina: Seeking Sustained Economic  
Growth with Social Equity, Report No. 32553.   
 
 
The long terms impact of programs also include the acquisition of useful skills and job 
prospects and impact on gender.  The RMP program in Bangladesh for examples attempts to 
build basic skills and to introduce the women beneficiaries into successful micro-enterprises.  
Although not all women are successful, 63 percent of them remain member of the NGO three 
years after leaving the program (CGAP, 2006).  In general the record of public works with respect 
to the promotion of gender equity is mixed.  For example, India’s Maharastra Employment 
Guarantee Scheme was designed to encourage the participation of women. Employment was 
provided within 5 km from their places of residence, creche facilities were provided, and male-
female wage discrimination was eliminated.  As a result, close to half of all participants were 
women (Subbarao, 2003).  In South Africa instead, although women were among the main target 
groups, only 23 percent of the employment generated by the programs actually went to women 
(Adato et al, 2001).  It is worth stressing in this context that there could be a trade-off between 
skills development and poverty targeting, or the extent of job creation with a public works 
                                                 
28 Growth Income curves (GIC) allow us to compare the incidence of growth in poorer segments of the population with 
that of richer segments or with the rate of growth of mean income (or expenditure)  
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program.  To this extent, public works programs with a strong objective of creating jobs may not 
pay much attention to skills development.   
 
Secondary and indirect impact 
The secondary and indirect impact of the programs on communities is a crucial outcome 
because the cost of transferring one dollar of income to a poor household under a public works 
program is much larger than a simple transfer (Ravallion, 1999).  The types of impacts usually 
considered include the positive effect generated by the assets created (school, road, etc.) and the 
possibly negative impact on labor market – salaries can be pushed downwards, or labor shortage 
might occur for example.  The analysis can be done using techniques ranging from an assessment 
of the quality of the assets and services created against accepted benchmarks to overall impact 
assessment.  The limited experience from India’s newly introduced National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme is that the program is contributing to capital formation in agriculture.  During 
the very first year 200607, 75% of 830,000 works undertaken with an expenditure of over Rs.90 
billion have been devoted to water harvesting structures, minor irrigation tanks, community wells, 
land development, flood control, plantation, etc., activities likely to contribute significantly to 
raising farm productivity. 
 
Another important secondary benefit from large, nation-wide PWPs may be an upward 
pressure on agricultural market wages via an enhancement of the bargaining power of workers 
who now have a PW program that virtually is serving as an unemployment insurance program. 
Gaiha (2000) noted that the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Program did contribute to 
enhancing the bargaining power of workers and exerted an upward pressure on market 
agricultural wages.  Public Works can thus serve to curb the oligopsonistic power of medium and 
large landlords.   
 
Quantitative studies show that well-designed workfare programs do have the potential to 
confer significant social gains from the assets created.  There is some evidence that in Zambia 37 
percent people in the areas covered by the public works projects improved their access to market 
(the project reduced distances by connecting previously disconnected road networks). Further, 15 
percent said that the attendance of pupils at school had improved because of the project. Finally, 
13 percent indicated that the project had improved access to health services due to higher ability 
to pay (Zambia ICR 34926).  In Peru the benefits of community assets built represent a 54 percent 
additional return for labor (Chacaltana 2003).  This figure is slightly lower than the indirect  
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multiplier of civilian works, estimated to be between 1 and 2, but this is the result of the mix of 
projects that include poorly valued activities, such as afforestation.  The overall multiplier effects 
of additional employment in the local economy was found to positive in the long run particularly 
where incomes saved were invested in further productive activities 
 
Measuring the aggregate impact of public works is a difficult task and it is not done very 
often.  There are, however, a few examples that show the overall positive impact of public works 
programs  that use higher percentage of labor intensity.  In Madagascar, Ramilison and 
Randrianarison (2007) use a macroeconomic model to assess the comparative advantage of using 
high labor intensity (HLI) versus high mechanical intensity (HMI).  They show in Table 10 that 
HLI programs have a much higher level of value added, household income, job creation than 
HMI.  This is because, the indirect contribution of HIL towards value added, income and so on, is 
very large.  Another alternative is to use computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to 
measure broader impacts  on macroeconomic variables such as net jobs created, income 
redistribution and so on.  For example Narayana, Kirit and T. N. Srinivasan (1991) have used a 
CGE approach to shown the aggregate impact of public works program to be highly beneficial to 
poor households.   
 
Table 8:  Comparative Analysis of the Investment Impact of Ar 164.4 billion on 
Infrastructure Work in Madagascar 
(In Ar  billions) 
  HLI  HMI 
Effect  Effect 
Direct  Indirect  Total  Direct  Indirect  Total 
Total Value Added   72.7  170.9  243.7  35.8  84.2  120.1 
Consumption  60.2  191.0  251.2  29.7  94.1  123.8 
Household Income  72.7  230.7  303.5  35.8  113.6  149.5 
Public Deficit  -155.3  15.6  -139.7  -152.3  7.7  -144.6 
  Public Expenditure  -164.4  0.0  -164.4  -164.4  0.0  -164.4 
  Public Revenue  9.1  15.6  24.7  12.1  7.7  19.8 
  Import Duties  8.4  8.9  17.4  11.8  4.4  16.2 
  Taxes on Goods and 
Services  0.0  4.6  4.6  0.0  2.3  2.3 
  Income Tax  0.7  2.1  2.7  0.3  1.0  1.3 
Balance of Trade  -91.7  -97.4  -189.0  -128.6  -48.0  -176.5 
Job Creation   54,276  96,814  151,090  26,746  47,707  74,452 
Coefficient       1.48      0.73 
Source: Macroeconomic framework and potential of approaches based on employment and local resources, Eric 
Ramilison and Jean Gabriel Randrianarison, 2007. 
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Cost effectiveness 
What is the cost effectiveness of public works programs in raising the income of the poor 
and reducing their poverty compared to other safety nets programs?  There is no doubt that public 
works are expensive way to transfer income to poor households, but the analysis of cost of the 
program as to has to take into account both the direct and indirect impact of the program 
illustrated above. It has been shown that public works, for example, are less costly alternatives to 
building small infrastructures, compared to using private contractors using more capital intensive 
methods. 
 
In practice the estimation of cost effectiveness of public works should take into account 
the costs and the benefits of the program.  The information on the costs should include budget 
data disaggregated by activity (labor, administrative, managerial, input materials), and by project 
(roads, irrigation infrastructure).  In addition it should also  take into account the targeting 
efficiency to assess the proportion of the funds that actually reach the intended beneficiaries.  The 
calculation of the benefits include: a) short term direct outcomes, measured by the increase in 




; and b) the potential medium-to-long term impacts indirect impact, measured by value 
added to the community and second round employment benefits from assets created.    
The information to conduct a comprehensive analysis of costs and benefits are not 
available.  In the absence of such information, analysts have attempted to calculate cost 
effectiveness using plausible assumptions.  Ravallion (1999) has suggested simple analytical tools 
to calculate a comprehensive measure to rapidly appraise the cost effectiveness of public works 
programs in raising the income of the poor.  The analysis proposed focuses on the values of five 
key variables:   
•  Labor intensity (in other words, the proportion of the total wage bill over the total 
operating cost; 
•  Targeting performance; proportion of the wages paid out to poor workers 
•  Net wage gain (in other words, gross wages minus all costs of participation incurred by 
workers);  
•  Indirect benefits flowing from the assets created. 
•  Budget leverage or the share of the government’s outlay that actually benefits the poor, 
when co-financing from non poor communities are required 
 
                                                 
29 However the loss of income transfer due to the opportunity cost might be overestimated in the aggregate.  It is 
possible in fact, that those few earning income opportunities bypassed by participants in the public works programs are 
being taken by other poor people.  
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The results of a simulation analysis in a low income setting show that the cost of 
transferring one dollar to poor people in low income with an average poverty rate of 50 percent is 
equal to $2.5 if future gains from assets created are taken into account and $3.6 if only current 
benefits are considered.  These simulations do not fully take account of the indirect and 
secondary beneficial effects of PW programs noted above and, to this extent, probably over-state 
the costs of transferring wage income under public works programs. However, the rapid appraisal 
method illustrated provides useful indication of the main design constraints for cost effective 
public works program, but it is only a simulation exercise not based on actual data and cannot 
substitute for rigorous evaluation.       
 
In our review of programs around the world we have collected some factual information 
on cost of the programs.  Figure 20 below shows the total cost per beneficiary per day including 
two components:  Wage rate and remaining cost (admin + Inputs).  It is evident from the table 
that the cost of the program varies by country and across programs in the same country as well.  
However the cost estimated derived from this table should be interpreted with caution, and in any 
case they are undoubtedly over-estimates and do not take into account any the benefits of the 
program mentioned above. 
 
Figure 20:  Cost per day per beneficiary for wage labor and other costs for four programs 
 







India - MEGS India - NREGA Ethiopia PSNP Malawi MASAF II
Non wage Wage 
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V.  Concluding observations and way ahead 
 
This paper has reviewed the varied experience of several countries bearing on objectives, 
design features, targeting, financing and implementation arrangements, and delineated cross 
county    patterns  with respect to all the above features in order to determine the factors 
contributing to its use as a successful safety net program.   
 
The analysis of patterns of program objectives shows that in most countries generally, 
and in middle income countries particularly, PWP has been mostly used in response to either a 
one-time large covariate shock (such as macro crises or a natural disaster), or in respect to repeat 
shocks such as periodic, often localized droughts or floods or surges in unemployment.  In low 
income countries, PWPs also have an antipoverty or poverty reduction objective.  Across regions, 
the sustainability of the program, and its implementing apparatus, varied a great deal depending 
mostly on the availability of funding.   For example, the unpredictability of donor funding, and 
the stop-and-go nature of the program in many African countries has hampered efficiency and 
reduced its effectiveness in accomplishing its main objectives.  In much of south Asia, on the 
other hand, the program is largely domestically funded, is sustained over time, thus creating 
significant within country capacity to expand or contract the program as needed, and virtually 
playing the role of unemployment insurance.  Regardless of the nature of funding, sustainability 
or otherwise, and geographic location, there is ample evidence to suggest PWPs have played a 
significant role in mitigating the impact of negative income shocks, provided care is taken to 
create an implementation structure, draw up a shelf of projects, and communities are involved in 
their selection. 
 
Our review does show that well designed and implemented PWPs can help mitigating 
income shocks and being used as effective anti-poverty instruments.  For example, India’s recent 
initiative in launching a 100-day guaranteed employment in rural areas attests to the considerable 
stake the Government of India reposes in this program to reduce rural poverty.  Two other South 
Asian countries – Bangladesh and Nepal – are also considering an intervention along the same 
lines.  However, this survey has shown that a number of steps need to taken to ensure that public 
works are used in an efficient and cost effective manner and thus achieve the intended objectives. 
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How to ensure PW efficiency and effectiveness 
The wide variation in the effectiveness of the program in accomplishing its goal raises the 
question: what makes for PWP to be a successful safety net intervention that can reduce poverty, 
especially seasonal poverty via consumption-smoothing, and also create useful public goods?   
This question is important, given the variation in use and efficiency of current programs in 
several countries.  
 
  Firstly, it is important to consider a PW program that: a) has clear objectives, following 
examples of patterns present in the regions with similar level of income; b) can result in the 
creation of valuable public goods; and c) has predictability of funding both for meeting the 
poverty alleviation objective and for responding to emergencies  
 
  Secondly, this review has shown that the success of the program depends a great deal 
on careful design and incorporation of all the key design features, such as: (a) setting the design 
parameters (such as the level of the wage rate and labor intensity) right, (b) establishing the 
implementation structure (paying attention to decentralization aspects as needed, depending upon 
country circumstances.   
 
  Thirdly, another important conclusion of this survey is that at every stage from 
decisions regarding the objective of the program to its design (especially wage setting), to 
coverage, scope and duration of the program and implementation modalities, countries have to 
confront a variety of choices and trade offs.  Depending on the set of choices made by a country, 
the outcomes and impacts vary accordingly.  These choices and trade offs have to be kept in mind 
while assessing the impacts and cost-effectiveness calculations of PW program.  
 
  Finally, a credible monitoring and evaluation system designed right upfront, prior to 
launching of the program can allow for mid course corrections and to respond to sudden changes 
which can inhibit effective implementation.  Considering that the program involves financial 
disbursements to various actors -- line departments, other implementing agencies, contractors, 
workers, etc. –  it is important to institute an oversight mechanism  such as the Social Audit 
planned for the new Indian program, to detect and prevent abuse including potential leakage of 
program funds.    
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The future of PW 
  The potential of the PWP program is enormous both in countries that have experiences 
with these programs and especially in countries that never used them.  Our review has shown that 
many countries have not implemented the program even though their circumstances make them 
eminently suited for such a program.  For example, this is the case of low income countries of 
Central Asia (such as Tajikistan) subjected to high seasonal unemployment and repeated shocks 
have not considered this program as a safety net.   
 
  More investigation is needed, though, to better understand the potential of PW 
programs in countries where they are not currently used and, in countries where they have been 
used extensively and over a long period of time, the second round effects of the impact of 
programs of the public goods generated on labor markets and poverty.  For example, a program 
that has generated significant irrigation infrastructure or roads (as was the case in Maharashtra 
Employment Guarantee Scheme), is most likely to generate second round employment effects 
from the created infrastructure.  Assessing such benefits is not easy and would require panel data.  
Furthermore, such an analysis of benefits from created infrastructure is also useful in 
understanding more fully than in present the distributional impacts of PWP programs, and their 
long term cost-effectiveness.  
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Appendix  1:  Information needs for Monitoring and Evaluation  
Monitoring and evaluation require qualitative and quantitative information collected at 
project site level, administration level, at household level, and at community level.  Table 6 
summarized examples of information that can be collected with different types of instruments.  
Quantitative data at project level relies mostly on the information collected routinely by the MIS, 
but can be complemented by project level data on a selected sample.  Surveys of beneficiaries and 
households are crucial to get feedback from the beneficiaries and also to perform proper 
evaluation of the outcomes.  Community level characteristics and perception are collected using 
surveys of local officials and communities and market surveys. 
Qualitative data provides in depth information collected through intensive, often repeated 
interviews with individuals and communities so as to explore perception and behavior of 
individuals and communities respect to program implementation and outcomes.  Collection 
techniques include key informant interviews, direct observation, and focus group (or community 
group) discussions. 
 
Table 9:  Examples of quantitative data to be collected for monitoring and evaluation  
 
Level of collection  Instruments  Information 
     
Project level 
MIS registry  Input and output indicators at project level 
and at local level 
Project level sample 
collection  Efficacy of design & implementation 
Household level 
Beneficiary Survey and 
citizen report card 
Access to program, service quality and 
satisfaction of implementation 
Cross-section household 
survey of beneficiaries 
Profile of beneficiaries & their households   
Income, assets and welfare level 
Eligibility and participation in the program 
Amount of transfers received 
Relevance & quality of training  
Longitudinal household 
surveys 
Similar info as in the household survey, but 
implies follow up of beneficiaries to gage 
long term impact 
Community level  
Local officials interviews  Perception on the implementation issues 
Communities and village 
level surveys 
Community characteristics in terms of labor 
market, wage rates, and level and quality of 
infrastructure  
Community perceptions of the benefit of the 
project 
Source: Collected from different sources from authors 
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Appendix  2: Sample M&E Indicators for Typical Public Works Program 
 
Input indicators 
•  Institutional arrangements (financing, implementing agencies) 
•  Budget allocation for salaries, intermediate inputs, and administration 
•  Amount of food available in the budget (food-for-work projects) 
•  Number of program staff by level 
 
Output indicators 
•  Projects 
o  Number of workfare projects and financial allocation by type (for example, with and 
without financing of materials) and by province or region 
o  Project specific  
  Description – Including community involvement and targeting method 
  Actual kilometers of water or sewer lines or roads maintained or built 
  Cost of managerial staff (number of people and wage rate) 
  Cost of non labor inputs 
  Wages paid to (skilled and unskilled) workers (per day, per month, by 
province, and overall) 
  Amount of food distributed as wages (for food-for-work projects) 
•  Asset maintenance information: who, how frequently? 
•  Beneficiaries 
o  Number of workers participating in the program 
o  Number of days, wage received, months when worked 
o  Total number of beneficiaries employed in each activity 
o  Key characteristics of beneficiaries: gender, age, previous economic activity, education 
level, number of children, previous participation in an employment or training 
program, household income, confirmation of education and health certificates 
o  Actual number of unemployed people who received the minimum wage 
 
Intermediate outcome indicators 
•  Projects 
o  Location of projects in poor areas (correlation of number of projects and total 
expenditures with the incidence of poverty, number of unemployed poor, and so on 
within the country and within provinces) 
o  Quality of projects completed 
o  Utilization by poor communities in the selection of infrastructure built, expanded, or 
rehabilitated under the program 
•  Beneficiaries 
o  Number of low-income workers employed in the project (total target, gender-specific 
target) 
o  Beneficiaries transaction costs 
o  Beneficiaries experiencing payment delays as a percentage of total beneficiaries 
 
Outcome indicators 
•  Increase in net annual earnings of the average individual beneficiary 
•  Number of program beneficiaries who transitioned from workfare to formal sector 
employment 
•  If the objective is to fight seasonal hunger: percentage of beneficiaries whose diet improved  
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•  Increase in second-round effects resulting from projects, for example, the number of people 
accessing roads or other infrastructure built or maintained 
 
Process and efficiency indicators 
•  Projects 
o  Average time taken to select viable projects (in calendar days) 
o  Number of projects appraised and evaluated per month (overall and by province) 
o  Number of projects evaluated as a percentage of total projects per month (overall and 
by province) 
o  Number of projects supervised per supervisor per month 
o  Number of supervision visits per project per month (overall and by province) 
o  Average number of supervision visits per project during project execution (overall 
and by province) 
o  Number of workfare activities executed by province (with and without financing of 
materials) 
o  Number of supervision visits to training courses and basic education courses 
o  Percentage of projects located in poor areas (quintiles 1 and 2) (target = 100 percent) 
o  Wages paid as a percentage of the contract amount 
o  Average cost (and range) per project category 
o  Average share of labor cost (and range) per project category 
o  Average share of the cost for wages in food (for food-for-work projects) 
•  Additional related objectives (such as community involvement) 
o  Percentage of projects with participation by nongovernmental organizations, civil 
society organizations, and so on (overall and by province) 
o  Percentage of projects sponsored by nongovernmental organizations, municipalities, 
and the like (overall and by province) 
•  Jobs 
o  Jobs provided per estimated target population (overall and by province) 
o  Poor (bottom quintile) workers as a percentage of public works laborers 
•  Administration 
o  Amount spent as a percentage of the amount allocated by province 
o  Efficiency of employment program (value of salaries received by workers as a 
percentage of total government cost of program) 
o  Labor intensity of projects 
o  Unit cost, for example, by kilometer of road built 
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Appendix 3:  Public Works programs, by Region, starting year, objective and targeting 
method. 
 
Country, Program  Region  Starting 
Year  objective  targeting 
Afghanistan, Labor Intensive Works Programme 
(LIWP)  SAR  2002  anti-poverty  combination 
Algeria, l'Indemnité pour Activité d’Intérêt Général 
(IAIG)  MNA  1994  1-time shock  self 
targeting 
Argentina, Jefes & Jefas  LCR  2002  1-time shock  combination 
Argentina, Trabajar   LCR  1996  1-time shock  combination 
Bangladesh, Food for work  SAR  1974  seasonal  self 
targeting 
Bangladesh, Rural Maintenance Program  SAR  1983  bridge to self 
empl  other 
Bolivia, PLANE (Red de Proteccion Social" (RPS))  LCR  end of 
2001  1-time shock  combination 
Botswana, Labour Intensive Public Works Project 
(LIPWP)  AFR  1978  seasonal  self 
targeting 
Bulgaria, From Social Assistance toward Employment  ECA  2002  almp  other 
Cape Verde, Frente de Alta Intensidade de Mão de 
Obra (FAIMO)  AFR  early 
1980s  seasonal  self 
targeting 
Chile, Direct Employment Programme  LCR  from 1993  1-time shock  other 
Colombia, Empleo en Accion (Red de Apoyo Social)  LCR  2001  1-time shock  other 
Egypt, PWP (SF for development project)  MNA  1993  anti-poverty  other 
Ethiopia, Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Programme 
(PSNP)  AFR  2005  anti-poverty  other 
India, Jawahar Rozgar Yojana JRY   SAR  1989  anti-poverty  other 
India, Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme  SAR  1979  guarantee  self 
targeting 
India, NREGA  SAR  2005  guaranteee  Self 
targeting 
Indonesia, Padat Karya (labor creation program)  EAP  1998  1-time shock  combination 
Indonesia, Mercy Corps’ CFW programme  EAP  2005  1-time shock  other 
Korea (Republic of), Public Work Projects  EAP  1998  1-time shock  other 
Madagascar, HIMO (FID)  AFR  2000  seasonal  other 
Malawi, Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) Public 
Works   AFR  1995  anti-poverty  Combination 
Malawi, Region Infrastructure Maintenance 
Programme (CRIMP)  AFR  1999  bridge to self 
empl  other 
Mexico, Programa de Empleo Temporal (PET)  LCR  1995  1-time shock  other 
Morocco, Promotion Nationale  MNA  1961  anti-poverty  combination 
Pakistan, Income Generating Project for Refugee 
Areas (IGPRA).  SAR  1984  anti-poverty  combination 
Peru, "A Trabajar Rural"  LCR  2002  1-time shock  combination 
Peru, "A Trabajar Urbano"  LCR  2002  1-time shock  combination 
Poland, PW  ECA  1992  almp  other 
Slovenia, PW  ECA  early 
1990s  almp  other 
Somalia, Action Contre la Faim (ACF)’s cash for work  AFR  2004  seasonal  other   
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South Africa, Expanded Public Works Program 
(EPWP)  AFR  2004  anti-poverty  combination 
Tanzania, TASAF Public Works Programme 
Component  AFR  2000  seasonal  combination 
Thailand, SIP (first channel)  EAP  1998  1-time shock  combination 
Uruguay, Programa de Actividades Comunitarias  LCR  2003  1-time shock  combination 
Yemen, (Republic of), Public Works Programs  MNA  1996  1-time shock  combination 
Zambia, Public Works  AFR  2002  anti-poverty  combination 
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Appendix  4:  Public Works programs, by type of work performed, and labor intensity. 
Country, Program  Types of work performed  Labor 
intensity  L/M/H 
Afghanistan, Labor Intensive Works 
Programme (LIWP)  Road construction, rehabilitation rural infrastructures.   70-80%  H 
Algeria, l'Indemnité pour Activité d’Intérêt 
Général (IAIG)  Cummunity based activities, such as reforestation.  80%  H 
Argentina, Jefes & Jefas 
Community services, construction, rehabilitation, and 
maintenance of small infrastructure facilities, and the 
execution of productive projects (on a pilot basis). 
around 40%  L 
Argentina, Trabajar   Infrastructures building, maintenance.  about 60%  H 
Bangladesh, Food for work  Rural roads construction.  60-70%  H 
Bangladesh, Rural Maintenance Program  Rural road maintenance.  _  _ 
Bolivia, PLANE (Red de Proteccion Social" 
(RPS))  Cleaning, maintenance, construction of infrastructures.  _  _ 
Botswana, Labour Intensive Public Works 
Project (LIPWP) 
The task, which mainly involves maintenance of dirt roads, is 
physical and strenuous. 
78% 
(63%?)  H 
Bulgaria, From Social Assistance toward 
Employment 
Construction and renovation works, social and other such 
works, environmental cleanup.  _  _ 
Cape Verde, Frente de Alta Intensidade de 
Mão de Obra (FAIMO) 
Rural roads, infrastructure in support of soil and water 
conservation.  _  _ 
Chile, Direct Employment Programme  Cleaning, improvement and maintenance of social 
infrastructures, and environment protection.  _  _ 
Colombia, Empleo en Accion (Red de Apoyo 
Social)  Maintenance & construction of urban and social infrastructure.  _  _ 
Egypt, PWP (SF for development project) 
Construction, rehabilitation and repair of irrigation and 
drainage canals, water supply and sewerage systems, rural 
roads and streets, and public buildings, and maintenance 
including canal cleaning, public buildings, solid waste 
collection, and disposal. 
30% 
average  L 
Ethiopia, Ethiopian Productive Safety Net 
Programme (PSNP) 
Improved land productivity, soil fertility restoration / increased 
land availability / improved market infrastructures (access) / 
improved access to drinking and irrigation water / improved 
schools and health facilities). Activities should be at the 
community level.  
_  _ 
India, Jawahar Rozgar Yojana JRY   Creation of rural economic infrastructures and community 
assets (eg. Schools, roads, other infrastructures)  60%  H 
India, NREGA 
Renovation of traditional water bodies; provision of irrigation 
facility; Micro irrigation works; drought proofing; flood control 
and protection; rural connectivity; land development. 
60%  H 
India, Maharashtra Employment Guarantee 
Scheme 
Water conservation works (e.g percolation and storage tanks), 
soil conservation and land development works, afforestation, 
roads, flood protection schemes. Multi-sectoral (irrigations, 
agric, soil conserv, rural roads…). construction of 
infrastructures in rural areas. 
60-70%  H 
Indonesia, Padat Karya (labor creation 
program) 
Building/repairing roads, drainage for agriculture, irrigation 
system / cleaning up slums areas, maintenance sewerage 
pipes / Rehabilitation of transportation infrastructure, e.g. 
roads, bridges.. / programs in the forestry sector.. 
About 41%  M 
Indonesia, Mercy Corps’ CFW programme  Facilitate clean-up and reconstruction in areas hit by the 
tsunami  >= 60%  H 
Korea (Republic of), Public Work Projects  Infrastructure maintaining; social services; environment 
cleaning work; information technology projects.  70%  H  
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Madagascar, HIMO (FID)  rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged or destroyed 
infrastructures after natural disasters  80%  H 
Malawi, Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) 
PW  Rural road maintenance  >=40%  L 
Malawi, Region Infrastructure Maintenance 
Programme (CRIMP) 
Activities supported include road construction and 
maintenance, irrigation infrastructure, flood control 
infrastructure, Afforestation, soil conservation and water 
retaining infrastructure. 
_  _ 
Mexico, Programa de Empleo Temporal 
(PET) 
Maintenance and construction of rural infrast, mainly rural 
roads.  50%  M 
Morocco, Promotion Nationale 
Chantiers d'equipment: construction and rehabilitation of rural 
infrastructures (rural roads, rural water supplies, schools, 
health centers, reforestation, small irrigation canals) / 
chantiers collectivites: by which administrative posts are 
funded mainly for provincial authorities and local municipalities 
as well as salaries of subordinate staff in hospitals,... / special 
programs for saharan regions: comprising all types of rural 
infrastructures to alleviate the negative effects of droughts. 
75%  H 
Pakistan, Income Generating Project for 
Refugee Areas (IGPRA). 
Reforestation, catchments management, the repair and 
improvement of irrigation and drainage systems, flood 
protection and river training, and road improvement. 
60%  H 
Peru, "A Trabajar Rural"  Rehabilitation, maintenance, and improvement of basic 
infrastructures (schools, health centers, rural roads)  about 50%  M 
Peru, "A Trabajar Urbano"  Cleaning, maintenance, and construction of infrastructures.  >=75%  H 
Poland, PW 
Infrastructural investments. Public works are carried out 
primarily in the framework of infrastructural investments, i.e. 
building a water supply system, a gas grid, a telephone 
network, a sewage treatment plant and also in construction 
and fitting works. 
_  _ 
Slovenia, PW 
Environmental and rural programs, and municipal services, 
also including providing child care and assistance to the 
elderly, education and culture. 
_  _ 
Somalia, Action Contre la Faim (ACF)’s cash 
for work 
Water catchments’ rehabilitation (mainly used to provide 
drinking water for animals).   _  _ 
South Africa, Expanded Public Works 
Program (EPWP) 
Maintenance of infrastructure and environment, social and 
economic employment opportunities   _  _ 
Tanzania, TASAF Public Works Programme 
Component 
Construction/rehabilitation of basic health care facilities, 
schools, boreholes, dams, latrines, shallow wells, and 
economic infrastructure. 
40%  L 
Thailand, SIP (first channel)  Community development works  about 16%  L 
Uruguay, Programa de Actividades 
Comunitarias 
Maintenance, rehabilitation of urban and social infrastr. 
(schools, health centers), protection of the environment, and 
also construction of urban infrastructures. 
_  _ 
Yemen, (Republic of), Public Works Programs 
Community Infrastructure. Small-scale civil works in areas 
with above-average unemployment rates for construction, 
rehabilitation, and/or extension of infrastructure works. 
43%  M 
Zambia, Public Works 
Construction, repair, rehabilitation, and maintenance to public 
assets in 38 districts in poor rural and urban districts most 
affected by the drought using labor intensive work methods. 
Assets include feeder roads, community roads, roads in 
periurban and urban areas, sanitation and drainage structures 
in urban and rural areas. 
at least 
60%  H 
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www.worldbank.org/sp. Summary Findings
This paper reviews the experience with public works programs (PWPs) in several 
countries over the past 20 years to delineate use patterns and to determine the 
factors contributing to its use as a successful safety net program. The analysis 
shows that PWP have been used extensively in response to either a one-time large 
covariate shock, or repeated shocks. In low income countries, PWPs also have an 
antipoverty or poverty reduction objective. Our review shows that well designed and 
implemented PWPs can help mitigating income shocks; the program can also be 
used as an effective anti-poverty instrument. The paper examines the factors behind 
the observed wide variation in the effectiveness of the program in accomplishing its 
goals and identifies prerequisites for making PWPs successful safety net interventions 
capable of protecting the poor from income shocks, thus reducing both temporal and 
seasonal poverty, while creating useful public goods or services for the communities. 
For PW programs to be successful, it is important firstly to: a) have clear objectives; 
b) select projects that can create valuable public goods; and c) ensure predictable 
funding. Secondly, the success of the program depends critically on careful design 
and incorporation of all the key design features. Finally, a credible monitoring and 
evaluation system designed right upfront, prior to launching of the program can allow 
for mid course corrections and to respond to sudden changes which can inhibit 
effective implementation. The potential of the PWP program is enormous both in 
countries that have experiences with these programs and especially in countries that 
never used them. However, more research is needed investigation is needed to better 
understand the impact of PWPs, such as second round effects from the created assets, 
the impacts on the labor market, and their cost-effectiveness after factoring in both 
the immediate and second round benefits from its program.
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